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I study nancial arrangements that arise in economies with limited enforcement.
Contractual promises are required to be rational for the obligated party at the time
of fulllment. Common also to each environment is perfect information. I study each
economy in general equilibrium with competitive markets.
In the rst chapter, I study the provision of liquidity by one cohort of private
agents to another building on the three-period model of Holmström and Tirole (Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 1998). Entrepreneurs issue nancial liabilities to nance
illiquid investment. As a precaution against a random cost shock, entrepreneurs
optimally buy, hold, and then sell a security that they cannot issue themselves. In
contrast to Holmström and Tirole, I do not allow government liabilities to serve this
purpose. Instead, I require that entrepreneursliquidity needs be satised endoge-
nously by circulation of third-party liabilities. The appropriate liabilities sell at a
price premium relative to securities that do not serve the liquidity need. Liquidity
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uncertainty can distort production allocations among producers with di¤erent risk
characteristics, and I show how issuers of circulating liabilities may be interpreted
as banks.
The second chapter presents an innite time-horizon exchange economy wherein
default cannot be punished by complete banishment from markets. An asset exists
in the economy that cannot be conscated, and that agents can never be prevented
from trading. The payo¤ to an agent in default is a function of present and fu-
ture prices and the agents ownership share of the non-collateral asset. Greater
ownership implies a higher payo¤ upon default; but a higher default payo¤ reduces
trading opportunities in equilibrium. Equilibration may generate volatile time-series
for endogenous variables. I document the quantitative implications by computing
equilibria of a plausibly calibrated economy.
In the last chapter, I study the ability of a simple limited enforcement economy to
explain arbitrary panel consumption data. Subject to satisfaction of mild inequality
restrictions, if the consumption allocation implies that each agents wealth is nite,
there is a feasible punishment institution that induces the data in equilibrium. The
result shows that limited enforcement economies hold signicant potential to explain
anomalous features and implications of such data.
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Liquidity Provision by Private
Agents
1 Introduction
Economists are accustomed to thinking of the supply of money and liquidity as
the province of government. While it is acknowledged in the abstract that private
institutions may create money, the micro-foundations for this phenomenon are
seldom taken very seriously, or assigned a prominent role by monetary theory. One
explanation for this state of a¤airs is that the monetary authority is often thought
to be able to a¤ect the supply of liquidity in a manner that mimics laissez faire
institutions. An alternative doctrine is that private institutions ought not to play a
role in the monetary system. In fact, the operation of private liquidity provision is
not well understood, and important issues that have been debated since the time of
Adam Smith remain unsettled.
In this paper, I construct a model of liquidity constrained investment in which
private liabilities are fully substitutable for any function that could be served by out-
side assets. In particular, I investigate how and to what extent the liquidity needs
of agents with investment opportunities can be met endogenously in the absence of
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outside assets and without enlightened intervention. The theory suggests an impor-
tant link between the nature of available investment projects and the availability of
liquidity in an economy, so that the liquidity supply function inherits the elasticity
properties of investment. The model also admits a surprising explanation for liq-
uidation of investment projects in an environment of liquidity crisis under perfect
information.
The notion of liquidity I employ is a simple one: liquidity is the means by which
wealth can be stored intertemporally. This denition is the one used by Holmström
and Tirole (1998) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2001). In each of these papers (as in
mine), an entrepreneur needs some form of security in order to ensure his access to
capital at the right time, and his e¤orts are hindered by enforcement frictions in two
dimensions. First, moral hazard at the time of production (in the future) generates
a wedge between the rate of return on private investment and that demanded by
the market. This implies that the entrepreneur cannot leverage the full value of his
project, so that liquidity (as dened above) can help him capitalize on his investment
opportunity. Second, futures markets do not operate e¢ ciently, so that liquidity may
be scarce.
Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) show that a fungible asset in xed supply can earn an
extra-fundamental liquidity premium(that is, a price higher than that consistent
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with its marginal product) and circulate like money. In their model, land serves
a collateral function in addition to its role as an input to production. Here the
scarcity of land is an exogenous property, and its price is determined endogenously.
In Holmström and Tirole, the liquidity need is met by a government asset that is
supplied perfectly elastically at a price xed exogenously. They show that the asset
may be demanded even if the price is higher than the fundamental one.
I adopt salient features of the model of Holmström and Tirole into my model, but
I depart from them by requiring that liquidity be supplied endogenously: there is no
government in my model. Instead, a second producer (whom I call the banker)
is introduced who is capable of issuing securities, backed by his project dividends,
that can be used by the entrepreneur to mitigate his liquidity needs. Notice that the
liquid securities in my economy are backed by investment, and to the extent that
the bankers investment depends on the market rate of interest, his issue of liquid
liabilities will do so as well. This phenomenon induces an upward-sloping liquidity
supply curve, which contrasts the vertical one in Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) and the
horizontal one in Holmström and Tirole.
Somewhat surprisingly, it is possible for liquidation of the bankers assets to occur
in equilibrium. This is because I will assume that the rate of return wedge described
above a¤ects also the banker, except when the banker terminates his project early.
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That is, the moral hazard problem associated with management of the bankers
project may be circumvented by liquidation. Therefore, even though the net return
on liquidated investment may be low, it may be that the banker can promise to
pay more to outside stakeholders when his project is liquidated than when it is al-
lowed to mature. This property engenders an interesting gambling behavior wherein
the banker terminates his investment in a state in which the liquidity need of the
entrepreneur is particularly acute.
The mechanism for liquidity provision in the model brings to mind the real bills
doctrinethat private nancial instruments backed by appropriate assets should be
allowed to supplement other media of exchange. Sargent and Wallace (1982) and
Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996) each construct models in which institutions
that a¤ord money creation under laissez faire conditions impart a benecial elasticity
to the supply of money. There is no scarcity of money per se, because these models
abstract from commitment frictions that might disqualify certain assets from serving
as security for a note. In Sargent and Wallace, for example, each intertemporal
trading opportunity may be assumed to give rise to a risk-free bill of exchange for
the full value of the desired transaction. Allocations are never constrained by the
quantity of money that can be conjured, because the issue of a note is assumed to
induce an obligation that does not admit default. The model of the present paper
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contributes to the understanding of the elasticity of the transactions medium by
showing how, when contracting frictions exist, valuable trading opportunities may
be missed due to a shortage of liabilities suitable for circulation. Whereas money
creation and credit creation are identical in these other environments, my model
implies an endogenous separation between the assets and the liabilities of the banker
even in a laissez faire setting.
With respect to the interpretation of institutions in the model, this paper is simi-
lar to Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). These authors investigate the transactions value
of riskless securities for Diamond-Dybvig-style liquidity traders, and rationalize the
circulation of those securities in equilibrium. The instruments used in these transac-
tions are interpreted alternatively as corporate debt or bank deposits, each serving
the same function in the model. Comparing the transactions velocities of bank de-
posits and corporate debt, the authors nd unsupported the empirical conclusion
that corporate debt serves the role ascribed in the model. However, it may be more
appropriate to make the comparison to savings deposits or CDs, as these seem more
attuned to meeting liquidity needs occurring at business cycle frequencies. I explore
this argument in the discussion section of the paper.
The position that the supply and availability of private liabilities a¤ects the
allocation of real resources can be supported empirically. First, while causality from
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money to output is notoriously di¢ cult to establish, it is known that broad measures
of money incorporating interest-bearing private marketable liabilities are more highly
correlated with output than the monetary base or M1.1 Thus were Friedman and
Schwartz (1963) motivated to focus on M2 in their famous study. Secondly, Friedman
and Kuttner (1993) have found that the six-month commercial paper rate is more
informative with respect to movements of output than the rate of interest on the
three-month T-bill. Other researchers have veried that this nding is quite robust.
At a minimum, this evidence suggests that the liabilities of the government do not
determine the nancial environment independent of the positions and capabilities of
other participants.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I introduce the
formal model and assumptions. In the third section, I conduct the formal analysis
of the model. The fourth section discusses my ndings and conjectures implications
that might be derived from various extensions. The last section summarizes and
concludes.
1See, for example, Cooley and Hansen (1995).
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2 Environment
2.1 Time, Preferences, and Endowments
The economy is inhabited by three agents, whom I label as the banker, the
entrepreneur, and the worker. I index these agents by i 2 fb; e; wg : There are three
dates t 2 f0; 1; 2g :
There is a single good in each period in the economy. The good is useful for
consumption at any date, and the dates 0 and 1 goods are useful also for investment in
production projects as discussed below. The date t good perishes if it is not consumed
or invested by the end of that date. At date 0, the banker and the entrepreneur have
endowments !b and !e; respectively. The worker has no endowment of the good at
date 0, and no agent is endowed with goods at dates 1 or 2.
The worker has an unlimited quantity of labor at dates 0 and 1 that may be con-
verted one-for-one into the contemporaneous good. Producing goods in this manner
has a disutility for the worker equivalent to one unit of consumption. The workers
labor is inalienable, so that a promise from the worker to provide labor in the future
can be reneged with impunity.2
The banker and the entrepreneur each have a production project that can be
2I provide a precise mathematical representation for this concept below.
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used to produce date 2 goods subject to a pattern of investment of goods at date 0
and 1. Projects are discussed in detail in the next subsection.
All agents are risk neutral. The banker and the entrepreneur evaluate outcomes
according to the sum of non-negative consumption at the three dates. The worker
evaluates outcomes according to the sum of consumption at each date minus labor
expended. At each date, agents act in order to maximize the expectation of their
payo¤ at the current and future date(s). Agents do not discount the future.
2.2 Production Projects
Production in the economy is a¤ected by the realization of a random variable that
is observed at date 1. The random variable takes on the value H with probability
; and L with probability 1  : For convenience of notation, I will sometimes write
s 2 S = fH;Lg for a generic outcome, and I write s for the probability that the
outcome is s: I will refer to a pairing of the date and the realization as the state;
that is, state 1s indicates date 1 when the realized outcome outcome is s: Abusing
the notation, I may refer to the state at date 0 as "state 0".
I rst describe the project of the entrepreneur.
At date 0, the entrepreneur chooses investment level Ie 2 R+: At date 1, the
project may need additional investment of goods in order to continue. Precisely, if
8
the outcome from the random variable at date 1 is H; then the project requires addi-
tional investment of (1  eH) Ie, where es 2 [0; 1] is the fraction of his project that
is discontinued in state 1s; and  > 0:3 For simplicity, I assume that no additional
investment is required in state L: Discontinuance or "liquidation" of the entrepre-
neurs project yields no residual, so that the fraction that is liquidated is simply lost.
At the beginning of date 2, the entrepreneur has an opportunity to abscond with a
booty of (1  es) Iee from the project and consume it, in which case he leaves the
remnants of the project valueless. If he chooses rather to allow the project to ma-
ture, then it yields an amount (1  es) IeRe to be divided according to agreements
reached by the entrepreneur with other agents. Note that the other agents have no
recourse against the entrepreneur when he absconds, but claims against the yield of
a project are enforceable once the entrepreneur has chosen to allow it to mature.
Assumption 1e. I assume that the mature yield of the entrepreneurs project
is greater than the value to the entrepreneur when he absconds, Re > e; and that
the net surplus available from investment is positive in expectation,
Re     1 > 0:
3In order to establish a more generalized and convenient notation, I will sometimes write L := 0
and H := :
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The project available to the banker is similar to that of the farmer, but never
requires additional investment at date 1. This project works as follows.
At date 0, the banker chooses an investment level Ib 2 R+: I allow for liquidation
of a fraction bs 2 [0; 1] of the bankers project in state 1s. Di¤erent from the
entrepreneurs project, there is a positive yield bsI
bL available from the liquidated
portion of the bankers project in state 1s; where L < 1: Like the entrepreneur,




Ibb at the beginning of date
2, scuttling the remainder of the project without recourse by other agents. If he
chooses instead to allow the project to mature, then the project yields a dividend 
1  bs

IbRb to be divided according to any agreement arranged at previous dates.
Assumption 1b. The mature yield of the bankers project is greater than the
value to the banker when he absconds, Rb > b; and the net surplus available from
investment in the bankers project is positive,
Rb   1 > 0:
2.3 Market Institutions
I assume that, at each date t 2 f0; 1g, a competitive market exists for state-
contingent claims to goods at date t+ 1: I write q1s for the date 0 price of claims to
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goods in state 1s; and I write q2s for the state 1s price of claims to goods in state
2s: I denote the consumption of agent i in state  by ci; I denote the labor supplied
by the worker in state  by n; and I denote the net claims to state ts consumption
held by agent i at the end of date t  1 by Bits:
2.3.1 The Workers Problem
The worker takes present and future claims prices as given, and chooses net
claims holdings, and non-negative consumption and labor to maximize his expected
lifetime consumption. The workers choices are subject to a sequence of budget
constraints, as well as time-consistency constraints reecting the inalienability of his
labor. Formulated mathematically, the worker chooses (cw; nw; Bw) to maximize





1s   n1s + cw2s) : (1)
subject to the budget constraints





1s  0 (2)
cw1s   n1s + q2sB2s  Bw1s for each s 2 S (3)
cw2s  Bw2s for each s 2 S; (4)
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and the individual rationality constraints
cw1s   n1s + cw2s  0 for each s 2 S: (5)
The constraints (2) and (3) require that the net purchases of the worker in the
dates 0 and 1 nancial markets are no greater than his wealth in the appropriate
state. The wealth of the worker at date 0 is zero, and he a¤ords nancial asset
purchases only by working more than he consumes. Similarly, his wealth in state
1s is given by his accumulation of assets from the previous period Bw1s: The date
2 budget constraints (4) show that the worker consumes no more in state 2s than
a¤orded by his accumulation of claims Bw2s: The last set of constraints (5) reect the
fact that the worker is free to renege on any agreement to provide labor that does
not benet him ex post; this it the mathematical manifestation of inalienable labor.
Inspecting this problem, it is obvious that any solution admits a continuum of
alternative solutions in which the worker increases his labor e¤ort and consumption
in some state by the same amount. Therefore, I will avoid ambiguities and simplify
the problem somewhat by characterizing the workers choice of net labor supply
x0 := n0   cw0 and x1s := n1s   cw1s at dates 0 and 1, rather then specifying precisely
his consumption and labor supply at these dates. The problem of the worker under
this transformation can be stated in the obvious way.
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2.3.2 The Entrepreneurs Problem
The entrepreneur takes current and future claims prices as given and chooses net
claims holdings, non-negative consumption and investment, and a project liquidation
rule (ce; Ie; e; Be) to maximize his expected lifetime payo¤. The objective function
















1s  !e (7)
ce1s + I
e (1  es) s + q2sBe2s  Be1s for each s 2 S (8)
ce2s  Be2s + Ie (1  es)Re for each s 2 S: (9)
The date 0 budget constraint (7) says that the entrepreneur can apply no more than
his endowment to date 0 consumption, investment, and purchase of nancial claims.
The date 1 budget constraints (8) say that accumulated claims must be used to fund
consumption, additional investment, and the portfolio to be held at date 2. Finally,
(9) says that date 2 consumption must be funded out of accumulated claims and
project dividends. Clearly, the last budget constraint is valid for the case that the
entrepreneur does not abscond with the project dividends; I discuss this possibility
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next.
Since the entrepreneur can always achieve consumption of (1  es) Iee at date 2
by his choice to abscond, allocations face an additional constraint in this regard. To
see this, suppose that the entrepreneur holds claims Be2s <  Ie (1  es) (Re   e) <
0 for some state at date 2. Then (9) implies that ce2s < (1  es) Iee; and the
entrepreneur can achieve a higher payo¤ by absconding. Under perfect information,
no agent would buy a quantity of claims from the entrepreneur that would induce him
to abscond at date 2. Equivalently, it must be that allocations for the entrepreneur
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints
ce2s  (1  es) Iee for each s 2 S: (10)
The problem of the entrepreneur may now be stated as that of maximizing (6)
subject to (7)-(10) :
The object ~Re := Re e; which is positive by Assumption 1e, plays an important
role in the analysis to follow. The simple moral hazard problem described above
creates a wedge between the internal rate of return available to the entrepreneur
through investment, and the share that can be pledged to outsiders. ~Re is the
marketable share of the entrepreneurs project, the maximal amount that can credibly
be pledged to outside stake-holders per unit of investment.
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Assumption 2e. The marketable share of the entrepreneurs project satises,
for all liquidation rules e 2 [0; 1] ;





This assumption can be seen to imply that, for su¢ ciently large investment Ie;
the entrepreneur will be unable to credibly promise to repay Ie   !e to outsiders; in
particular, the entrepreneur will be unable to nance an arbitrarily high amount of
investment.
2.3.3 The Bankers Problem
The problem of the banker is very similar to that of the entrepreneur. The banker
takes prices as given and chooses net claims holdings, non-negative consumption and
investment, and a project liquidation rule
 
cb; Ib; b; Bb





















1s  !b (12)
cb1s + q2sB
b
2s  Bb1s + IbbsL for each s 2 S (13)




Rb for each s 2 S; (14)





b for each s 2 S: (15)
The constraints (12)-(14) are to be interpreted analogously to (7)-(9) for the en-
trepreneur, with the principle exception that the banker has no need of additional
funding at date 1, and instead may obtain goods at that date by liquidating a portion
of his project. The incentive compatibility constraint (15) is derived and interpreted
analogously to (10) :
Like that of the entrepreneur, the marketable share of the bankers project, de-
ned as ~Rb := Rb   b; plays an important role in the analysis to follow. I make the
following assumption analogous to Assumption 2e.
Assumption 2b. The marketable share of the bankers project is less than one,
~Rb < 1:
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2.3.4 Denition of Equilibrium
In the analysis to follow, the central objects of interest will be the issue and pur-
chase of claims by agents in the model. I follow this route because the interpretations
I will o¤er focus on properties of nancial markets in equilibrium. Given this agenda,
it is sensible to posit a denition of equilibrium in terms of these markets, rather
than the market for goods. The following denition is, of course, equivalent to one
that incorporates a goods market clearing condition
An equilibrium is an allocation fc; n; I; ;B; qg of consumption, labor, investment,
liquidation policies, net assets holdings, and asset prices such that (i) each agents
problem is solved; and (ii) the markets for contingent claims to consumption clear





It is easy to see that each agents marginal rate of substitution of consumption
at date 0 for consumption in state 1s is s; and that of consumption in state 1s for
consumption in state 2s is 1. Therefore, I will refer to the price system dened by
q1s = s and q2s = 1 for each s as the fundamental one. As will be seen in the next
section, this price system need not support an equilibrium.
The following assumption implies that the liquidity shock to the entrepreneurs
project may induce a liquidity problem in the sense that the entrepreneur will need
to hoard assets in order to continue his project in the bad state.
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Assumption 3. The marketable share of the entrepreneur is less than the addi-
tional investment required in state 1H, ~Re    < 0:
3 Analysis
3.1 The Role of the Worker
Looking at the problem solved by the worker, it is clear that his optimal policy
must have each budget constraint binding. By solving the dates 1 and 2 constraints





s ( x1s + cw2s)




q1s ( x1s + q2cw2s)  0
and the individual rationality constraints
 x1s + cw2s  0 for each s 2 S: (16)
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(Recall that x0 and x1s are the net labor supplies of the worker in states 0 and 1s;
respectively.) Taking the rst-order conditions for x0; x1s; and cw2s; one can derive
the necessary conditions, for each s;
ws = q1s   s
and
1  q2s  0; with equality if c2s > 0, (17)
where ws is a non-negative Lagrange multiplier on the workers state 1s individual
rationality constraint. It is immediate that the workers problem has a solution only
if q1s  s and q2s  1: These properties are a manifestation of the workers innite
capacity to purchase assets that yield a positive return. For example, if it were true
that q1s < s; then the worker could prot by converting an arbitrarily large amount
of date 0 labor into date 0 goods, and trading the date 0 goods for claims to state
1s consumption. Since none of his constraints are violated by making x0 arbitrarily
positive while setting x1s =  x0=q1s; and since the net contribution of the scheme
to his lifetime expected payo¤ is 1s=q1s   1 > 0 per unit of net labor expended, the
workers problem has no solution. Since the denition of equilibrium requires that
the workers problem have a solution, such prices are precluded. Thus, I have proved
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the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If q is an equilibrium price system, then q1s  s and q2s  1 for each s:
On the other hand, there is no symmetric argument available that shows that
q1s cannot be higher than s in equilibrium. To see why, use (17) to derive the
complementary slackness condition q2scw2s = c
w
2s; and note that this implies (from (3)
and (4)) that
Bw1s =  x1s + cw2s:
Now the individual rationality constraints (16) imply that Bw1s  0 for each s:
Whereas the worker can can buy assets to take advantage of a low price of date
1 consumption, his inability to commit to supply future labor prohibits his issuing
assets to take advantage of high prices. The following proposition is an important
extension of this discussion.
Proposition 2 If q is an equilibrium price system,4 there is an optimal policy for
the worker with claims holdings Bw if and only if the following hold for each s:
(i) Bw1s  0 with equality if q1s > s; and
(ii) Bw2s  0 with equality if q2s > 1:
Proof. The result is obvious from the discussion above.
4In particular, the lemma is true if q1s  s and q2s  1:
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One implication of this result is that the market interest rates may not be too
high, but may be low. For example, the analysis above indicates that the interest
factor earned by non-contingent two-period loans, which is R := (
P
s q1sq2s)
 1 ; is no
greater than each agents marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of date 0 goods
for sure claims to goods at date 2, R  1: Moreover, it will be seen in what follows
that equilibrium may have R < 1:
3.2 A Simple Special Case
In this subsection, I analyze the special case of the model in which the probability
that the additional investment by the entrepreneur will be necessary is one; that is
 = 1: This case simplies several aspects of the exposition by allowing me to more
clearly focus on the date 0 market for state 1H claims. As will be seen in the next
subsection, this market will retain its conceptual centrality in the general case even
while other elements may create distraction.
The simplications a¤orded in the present case are as follows. First, the dimen-
sion of the space in which claims prices lie is halved. Second, it is obvious that
no agent will choose to liquidate a project, since (under perfect foresight) he could
always do better by simply reducing the scale of investment ex ante. Whereas the
increase of the dimension of the price space in the sequel is simply a (notational)
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nuisance, the second factor represents a conceptual limitation of the present case.
The simplest case does have one unique conceptual virtue: it dispels any tendency
to think about the liquidity problem studied here as inseparable from "risk". More
precisely, one should take away the understanding that the liquidity need of the
entrepreneur is not induced by uncertainty.
I take advantage of these simplications by imposing that bH = 
e
H = 0 a priori,
and by ignoring reference to the outcome of the random process where there can be
no confusion. For example, I will write q1 rather than q1H ; and I will write cb1 instead
of cb1H : I do this in the present subsection only.
From the analysis of the previous subsection, it can be seen that the market
return on two-period saving is less than the return available to the banker on funds
invested internally. That is, R  1 < Rb; where R = (q1q2) 1 in the present case,
and the second inequality follows from Assumption 1b. As will be seen, this "wedge"
can exist in equilibrium, because of the moral hazard frictions that prevent agents
from exploiting the full potential of investment projects using nancial markets. In
this environment without a consumption smoothing motive, the banker will nd it
advantageous to borrow as much as possible against project proceeds and apply all
of his lifetime wealth toward investment.




is a feasible policy for the banker, and that
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as follows. Let ~cb0 = 0;
~Ib = Ib + ; and ~cb2 = c
b
2 + R
b: Let the remaining elements of the new policy be
identical to the old. Now it is easy to check that the new policy is feasible if the old
one is. Moreover, subtracting the payo¤ under the old policy from that generated








an improvement can easily be constructed by applying the date 0 nancial value
of the surplus to investment, and using the increase in output to augment date 2
consumption.5 These results are stated formally and proved for the general case in
Lemma 5 below.
At an optimum, each agents budget constraints bind, and these can be solved





where one should recall the denition of the marketable share of the bankers project
~Rb := Rb   b: Of particular interest for the equilibrium concept described above is
the pattern of claims holdings adopted by the banker under equilibrium prices. From
the period budget constraints, one has the following result.
5More precisely, if one had cb1 = ; an improving policy has ~c
b
1 = 0 with ~I




b; and a policy with cb2 = I










Proposition 3 Suppose that additional investment by the entrepreneur is required
with probability one. At equilibrium prices q; there is an optimal policy for the banker
with claims holdings Bb if and only if










One subtlety of the presentation of this result is worth noting, as it pertains
to language that I will use several times below. The hypothesis of "equilibrium
prices" implies that the denominator in the expressions above must be positive. To
see this, it su¢ ces to notice that the banker could nance unlimited consumption
if 1   q1q2 ~Rb were negative. By eliminating the claims holdings from the binding









Then by setting cb0 = c
b
1 = 0 and c
b
2 = I
bb; it may be seen that the left-hand-side is
decreasing in Ib if 1 q1q2 ~Rb  0: Since this policy satises the incentive constraint by
construction, the bankers problem has no nite solution, contradicting the denition
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of equilibrium.
This property of equilibrium has an intuitive interpretation that may be facili-




as the leverage ratio of the banker.
This is the factor by which the market prices allow the banker to multiply his own
endowment to determine his maximal issue of liabilities at date 2. In equilibrium,
the market interest factor R is determined by the interplay of the supply and demand
for liquid claims. The negativity of the bankers claims holdings clearly shows that
he acts on the supply side, as a borrower. As the market interest rate, the rate de-
manded by lenders, is reduced, the banker is able to issue more and more liabilities,
and this amount tends to innity as the rate approaches the marketable share of the
banker. Thus, any nite demand for liquid liabilities can be quenched by the supply
of the banker for some R > ~Rb; so that the leverage ratio will always be nite (and
positive).
The essential distinction between the problem of the entrepreneur and that of the
banker is that the entrepreneur must cope with the need of additional investment
at date 1. Because the marketable share of the entrepreneurs project is assumed
(Assumption 3) to be less than the investment need at date 1 (with probability one
in the environment under consideration), it will be seen that the entrepreneur will
be a net buyer of date 1 claims at date 0. This is in stark contrast to the role played
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by the banker. As has been shown above, the equilibrium price of date 1 claims may
be high. Therefore, the need of liquidity may impinge upon the protability of the
entrepreneurs project in a non-fundamental way. For example, it will be seen that
q1 may be high enough that the net private return from investment is not positive
under any policy for the entrepreneur.
If the fundamental prices hold, then the entrepreneur will desire to invest as
much in his project as possible. This case leads him to behave as the banker does,
consuming nothing at dates 0 and 1, and taking the maximal amount of leverage
against project proceeds by setting date 2 consumption so that his incentive com-
patibility constraint binds. On the other hand, if the price of future claims rises
above fundamentals, then the entrepreneur will desire to transfer as much of his
future consumption to date 0 as possible for any given level of investment. The prin-
cipal di¤erence between the two cases is that it may be optimal for the entrepreneur
to consume his endowment (rather than invest) at date 0 if the price of liquidity is
su¢ ciently high.




and now the dates 1 and 2 budget constraints can be used to write optimal claims
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Be2 =  Ie ~Re: (21)
(Recall that ~Re := Re   e is the marketable share of the entrepreneurs project.)
Now it can be seen that (19) and (21) imply that q2 = 1 in equilibrium; for if not,




2 < 0 contradicts the market
clearing condition. In meeting the liquidity need, the entrepreneur sells at date 1 the
securities he purchases at date 0 for capital goods. Thereafter, the worker holds all
of the outstanding liabilities of the other two agents, a position he will only accept
if the price of claims is consistent with fundamentals.
On the other hand, because the entrepreneur is a net buyer of claims to date 1
goods (that is, Be1  0); the market for such claims may not clear at the fundamental
price. This can be seen more easily by looking at a reduced form of the entrepreneurs
problem. Solving the entrepreneurs budget constraints for date 0 consumption by
eliminating his claims holdings and substituting the result into his objective function,
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where the constraint inheres from the non-negativity of date 0 consumption. If the
expression in square brackets in the objective function is positive, then each unit of
investment increases the payo¤ of the entrepreneur, and he will invest the maximal






and the inequality follows from Assumption 1e after some algebra. The next propo-
sition is the important corollary of this discussion.
Proposition 4 Suppose that additional investment by the entrepreneur is required
with probability one. At equilibrium prices q; there is an optimal policy for the en-
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for some  2  (q1) ; where
 (q1) :=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1; for q1 < q̂
[0; 1] ; for q1 = q̂
0; for q1 > q̂:
Proof. The result is obvious from the discussion above.
Figure 1 shows the date 0 "supply of liquidity" by the banker and the "demand
for liquidity" by the entrepreneur as functions of the price of liquidity, where these
objects are dened as follows.6 The supply of liquidity is the amount of date 1 claims
issued by the banker at date 0, which is the opposite of his claims holdings. From
Proposition 3 and the fact that q2 = 1 in equilibrium, the supply of liquidity is given






The family of broken curves in the gure represent the supply of liquidity for di¤erent
values of the bankers date 0 endowment !b: The demand for liquidity is the entre-
preneurs holding of date 1 claims given in Proposition 3. The demand is represented
by the solid curve in the gure.7
The supply and demand of liquidity represent a convenient device for characteriz-
ing the equilibrium price of liquidity q1 as follows. First, if the curves do not intersect
for some q1   (= 1) ; then the supply of liquidity by the banker at the fundamental
price exceeds the demand of the entrepreneur; this is the case for the highest broken
curve representing the largest value of !b in the gure. From Proposition 2, it is clear
that the worker will be able and willing to purchase excess liquid claims supplied by
the banker at the fundamental price q1 = 1; apparently, this is the equilibrium price
in this case.
Next, if the curves intersect for some price between the fundamental price and q̂,
as they do for the intermediate of the supply curves in the gure, then the equilibrium
exhibits a liquidity price premium on liquid claims and no liquidation is required
by the entrepreneur. The price premium induces the banker to borrow more than
7The parameters used in the plot are those of the Example 1 below.
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he would under fundamental prices, essentially subsidizing his investment. At the
same time, the entrepreneur reduces investment relative to what he would choose
otherwise, because the added price of providing for the continuation of his project
impinges on his ability to raise capital and invest. In this case, the price premium
dissuades the worker from purchasing any of these claims, and all of the claims issued
by the banker are purchased by the entrepreneur.
The third possibility is that the curves intersect at the price q̂; as they do for
the lowest supply curve in the gure. In this case, the entrepreneur is indi¤erent
with respect to investment, and in equilibrium, he invests exactly the amount that
can be continued at date 1 using the claims issued by the banker at this price. The


















the equation of the liquidity supplied by the banker to the demand of the entrepre-
neur.
Example 1. The parameters used in the plot are Rb = 5
4
; b = 1; Re = 3; e = 2;
and  = 3
2
. One can calculate that ~Rb = 1
4
; ~Re = 1; and q̂ = 2: The endowment of
the entrepreneur is !e = 1; and the endowments of the banker for the three curves
31







In the  = 1 case, the entrepreneur may be more precisely described as an agent
in need of means of preserving the continuity of a project that is valuable only to
him privately. In particular, there is no attraction in the project for an outside
speculator. A suitable allegory is perhaps that of a buyer of a house at date 0. At
date 1, after he has retired, the roof will need to be repaired. At date 2, the house
can be sold if it is properly maintained, but the house buyer will not maintain it if
a high proportion of sale proceeds must be allocated to repay a loan taken at date 1
to pay for the roof. Therefore the required capital cannot simply be raised ex post
by placing a lien on the house.
The problem of this entrepreneur is to buy the biggest house possible while storing
enough of his date 0 wealth to meet the date 1 obligation. If there is a su¢ cient
quantity of real assets in the economy at date 0, then the problem is a simple one
based on fair accounting at fundamentals. On the other hand, if such assets are
scarce, then the degree of this scarcity will a¤ect the entrepreneurs decisions in a
non-fundamental way.
The entrepreneurs demand for liquidity is met by the issue by the banker of
liquid liabilities. Considering the bankers balance sheet at date 0, one nds assets
consisting of his illiquid investment, and liabilities consisting of claims against the
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yield of that investment. One may interpret these liabilities as having a two-period
maturity, rather than literally being redeemed for an equivalent issue. Under this
interpretation, some of these privately issued claims circulate from the entrepreneur
to whom they are sold at date 0 to the worker at date 1, by whom they are nally
redeemed at date 2. These liabilities behave as money in a well-dened sense.
3.3 More General Cases
The generalization of the model introduces important conceptual nuances to be
explored in this subsection. Because of the richness of possibilities and the hetero-
geneity of agents opportunities, this discussion is potentially very complex. For
this reason, I will assume in the remainder of the text that the probability of the
liquidity shock is low enough that the entrepreneurs project may be protably un-
dertaken even when it will be fully liquidated in the bad state. This assumption is
not necessary, but it simplies the exposition without signicant conceptual loss.
From the previous subsection, one can get the avor of the case excluded here.
When  is high and as the price of liquidity rises, the entrepreneur will prefer to
reduce his a priori investment rather than liquidate his project after it is begun.
When this probability is low, on the other hand, he will do the opposite; that is, he
will invest as much as possible and liquidate if necessary. In the market for liquidity,
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the two modes of behavior are qualitatively identical, since the liquid claims desired
by the entrepreneur will be proportional to the product of his investment and the
fraction of the project that he will continue, Ie (1  eH) : Because one case holds
little interest independent of the alternative, I choose to relegate one to an appendix
to simplify matters. Formally, I assume in the remainder of the text that
(1  )Re   1 > 0: (22)
With respect to investment at date 0, the motivation of the banker is little
changed in the general environment from that of the special case considered above.
The restrictions derived on equilibrium prices in subsection 3.1 imply that the pri-
vate rate of return available from investing will always exceed the market rate of
interest. Therefore the banker will invest all of his endowment in his project, and
he will arrange his portfolio in order to maximize expected consumption at date
2. In particular, he will forego consumption at dates 0 and 1, and leverage date 2
consumption maximally so that incentive compatibility constraints bind. The fol-
lowing lemma contains the formal statement of this fact; the proof is contained in
an appendix.
Lemma 5 At equilibrium prices, the banker will choose to consume nothing at dates
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0 and 1, and he will choose date 2 consumption so that his incentive compatibility
constraint is binding in each state; that is, cb0 = 0; and c
b








In the case of the entrepreneur, the simplication discussed above is immediately
relevant and apparent. Recall from the special case  = 1 that the entrepreneur
may be indi¤erent about investing when the price of liquidity becomes too high. In
sharp contrast to the bankers behavior, it was shown that the entrepreneur may even
choose to consume some of his endowment rather than invest it. The next lemma
shows that this is not the case when  is low; the proof is contained in an appendix.
Lemma 6 Suppose that (22) holds. At equilibrium prices, the entrepreneur will
choose to consume nothing at dates 0 and 1, and he will choose date 2 consumption
so that his incentive compatibility constraint is binding in each state; that is, ce0 = 0;
and ce1s = 0 and c
e
2s = (1  es) Iee for each s:
At an optimum under equilibrium prices q; Lemma 5 and the binding budget













Generalizing the argument put forth for the simpler case, it is easy to see that the
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denominator of this expression must be positive at equilibrium prices for all feasible
liquidation rules of the banker. If this were not the case, inspection of the form of
the problem shows that a feasible policy exists that gives the banker any arbitrarily
large payo¤. This is obviously precluded by the denition of equilibrium. As before,
the intuition for why this cannot hold in equilibrium is that the liquid claims issued
by the banker will be in proportion to his payo¤, so that nite demand for these
claims can be met by the supply of the banker at a price lower than that a¤ording
him innite payo¤.
Now using Lemma 5 and eliminating investment using (23) ; some algebra shows



















This objective function has a simple interpretation. The factor b is the bankers
date 2 consumption per unit of residual (i.e., un-liquidated) investment at that date.
The expression in braces is the average (i.e., expectation) over states of the residual















is the maximal ratio of investment to the bankers initial endowment that is a¤orded
by the incentive compatibility constraints, which is the leverage ratio of the banker.
Therefore !bb is the investment of the entrepreneur. The last factor,
P
s s (1  
e
s) ;
is clearly the unconditional expectation of the fraction of the bankers project that
will not be liquidated before date 2 under the chosen policy. Obviously, the banker
gets no utility from liquidating a portion of his project.
Under condition (22) ; the same logic can be applied to the case of the entrepre-









q2s ~Re   s
 ; (25)













q2s ~Re   s

9=; :
The latter admits an interpretation similar to that for (24) :
Although it is straightforward to characterize the optimal liquidation policies at
this point by jumping to the rst-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions of these strictly
8Analogous to the case of the banker, in order for the entrepreneurs problem to have a solution,
the denominator of the expression on the RHS must be positive for all e 2 [0; 1]2 ; therefore,
equilibrium prices must have this property.
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quasiconcave functions, I want rst to show how the price space may be simpli-
ed. Doing so drastically simplies the manipulation and intuition value of these
characterizations.
Corollary 7 At equilibrium prices, it must be that q1L = 1   and q2s = 1 for each
s:
The proof, which is contained in an appendix, proceeds by showing that the
extra-fundamental prices in any market except that for state 1H claims must must
either violate market clearing or the result of Proposition 2. In particular, in each
market except that for claims in state 1H; both the banker and the entrepreneur
will be net issuers (negative claims holders). Therefore, the relevant market clearing
conditions imply that the claims holdings of the worker must be positive for these
markets, and then Proposition 2 shows that the fundamental prices must prevail.
It is now possible to characterize the equilibrium liquidation policies followed by
the agents in the most simple form. Thereafter I can characterize the equilibrium
with reference only to the market for liquidity (that is, state 1H claims), by pinning
down the price of liquidity q1H :
For the banker, one has the following.
Lemma 8 Suppose that q is an equilibrium price system.
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1. If ~Rb  L then the banker will never liquidate his project in any state in equi-
librium.
2. If ~Rb < L; then, in equilibrium, the banker will never liquidate his project in
the good state, but liquidation will occur in the bad state if the price of state
1H claims is high enough. More precisely, the optimal liquidation policy for
the banker has bL = 0 and 
b
H 2 b (q1H) ; where
bq1H :=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0; if q1H < qb
[0; 1] ; if q1H = qb
1; if q1H > qb;
and
qb :=
1  (1  ) ~Rb
L  (1  ) ~Rb
:
It may be surprising that the banker would ever liquidate his project in this
environment, since he can always choose his investment and structure his claims
portfolio so that it is not necessary to do so. The key to the seeming paradox
obviously lies in the condition that the marketable share of the bankers project must
be less than its liquidation value for liquidation to be optimal. In this case, the banker
can raise more outside funds by promising to liquidate. Therefore, though the banker
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gets no payo¤ in the event, liquidation in the bad state allows him to increase his
investment. If the price of liquidity is high enough, the increased investment a¤orded
may su¢ ciently increase his payo¤ in the good state to compensate (in expectation)
for the sacrice of any payo¤ in the bad state. This result will be discussed at greater
length in the next section.
For the entrepreneur, the optimal liquidation policy abides the following.
Lemma 9 Assume that condition (22) holds. At equilibrium prices, the entrepreneur
will never liquidate his project in the good state, and there is a cuto¤ level q >  of
the price of liquidity such that liquidation is optimal in the bad state if and only if
q1H  q: More precisely, optimality has eL = 0 and eH 2 e (q1H) ; where
e (q1H) :=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0; if q1H < q
[0; 1] ; if q1H = q
1; if q1H > q;
and
q :=





Lemmas 8 and 9 are proved in the appendix.
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the bankers claims holding can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 10 Suppose that q is an equilibrium price system.
1. The banker will be a net issuer of claims in each state; that is, his holdings of
claims will be non-positive.
2. If the liquidation value of the bankers project is no greater than its marketable
share, then his holdings of claims will be strictly negative and equal in each
state; precisely, if L  ~Rb; then
Bbts =  Ib (q1H ; 0) ~Rb =  
!b ~Rb
1  (1  + q1H) ~Rb
for t 2 f0; 1g and s 2 fH;Lg :
3. If the liquidation value of the bankers project is greater than its marketable
share, then (i) his holdings of claims will be negative in state 1s for each s; and
in state 2L; but (ii) his state 2H holdings may reect liquidation of a portion
of his project and retirement of liabilities. More precisely, there is an optimal
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for some bH 2 b (q1H) :
Proof. The result follows easily from the bankers budget constraints in light of
previous results.
The following proposition characterizes the set of state 1H claims holdings that
can be optimal for the entrepreneur at equilibrium prices. This knowledge is all one
needs to know about the behavior of the entrepreneur in order to characterize the
equilibrium prices. The optimal state 1H claims holdings of the entrepreneur dene
his "demand for liquidity".
Proposition 11 Suppose that (22) holds. At equilibrium prices, there is an optimal
policy for the entrepreneur with claims holdings Be only if
Be1H = 












for some eH 2 e (q1H) :
Proof. The result follows easily from the entrepreneurs budget constraints, equation
(25), and Corollary 7.
Now the price of liquidity, the only element of the equilibrium price system that
has not been pinned down, may be characterized according to the algorithm described







issue of claims when the equilibrium price is q1H and his optimal liquidation decision
species that he liquidate the share bH of his project in the bad state. Then by
Proposition 10,



















Proposition 12 Suppose that (22) holds.
1. If the bankers issue of liquid claims is at least as great as the entrepreneurs de-
mand for them at the fundamental price, then this price supports an equilibrium
without liquidation by the entrepreneur. More precisely, if b (; 0)+e (; 0) 
0; then in equilibrium q1H = ; there is no liquidation; and agents state 1H
claims are given by Bb1H = 
b (; 0) ; Be1H = 
e (; 0) ; and Bw1H =  Bb1H Be1H :
2. If the bankers issue of liquid claims is less than the entrepreneurs demand
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for them at the fundamental price, and the marketable share of the bankers
project is at least as great as its liquidation value, then the equilibrium price of
liquidity will be greater than the fundamental price, and the entrepreneur may
be required to liquidate a portion of his project in the bad state. Precisely, if
b (; 0) + e (; 0) > 0 and ~Rb  L; then q1H uniquely satises b (q1H ; 0) +
e (q1H ; 
e
H) = 0 with 
e
H 2 e (q1H) :
3. If the bankers issue of liquid claims is less than the entrepreneurs demand
for them at the fundamental price, and the marketable share of the bankers
project is less than its liquidation value, then the equilibrium price of liquidity
will be greater than the fundamental price, and one or both of the producers
may choose to liquidate a portion of his project in the bad state. Precisely, if








e (q1H ; 
e
H) = 0 with 
b
H 2 b (q1H) and eH 2 e (q1H) :
Proof. The result follows from the previous ones and the denition of equilibrium.
Two additional examples are presented in the next section.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Liquidity Provision, Inside Money, and Output
In the model presented here, a liquidity need is generated by the conuence of two
factors. First, moral hazard induces a wedge between market and private valuations
of projects. Second, inalienable labor implies that unsecured promises may not be
credible, so that futures (e.g., insurance) contracts that could otherwise be useful in
mitigating the rst problem may be impossible to construct. In such an environment,
marketable securities may acquire an extra-fundamental value commensurate with
their name: they act to secure access to capital in the future by preserving wealth
over time.
The liquidity value of collateral securities has been investigated in varied environ-
ments by Holmström and Tirole (1998) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1998, 2000, 2001).
Holmström and Tirole, whose modeling devices I have essentially incorporated here,
investigate (inter alia) the utility of a government bond to ameliorate the liquidity
problem. In their model, the supply of the liquid security is exogenous and perfectly
elastic. In Kiyotaki and Moore (1998, 2000, 2001), collateral is in xed (perfectly
inelastic) supply. Thus, each of these papers abstracts from the topic of primary
interest here.
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While each of these papers examines how liquidity problems a¤ect rms that
experience them, the important innovation of the present model is a detailed theo-
retical analysis of how liquidity may be provided by the issue of liquid securities by
rms that do not. One implication is that, as long as some rms are una¤ected, and
as long as those rms are capable of issuing fungible securities, liquidity problems
can have qualitatively di¤erent e¤ects in di¤erent sectors. The following example
illuminates the possibility that some sector may be beneted by such episodes.
Example 2. Let Rb = 12
7
; Re = 2; b = e = 8
7
;  = 8
7
;  = 1
4
; !b = 2
7
; !e = 5
7
; and
suppose that L  4
7
: Thus, ~Rb = 4
7
; ~Re = 6
7
; and    ~Re = 2
7
: Note that (22) holds
(the left-hand side equals 1
2
); and one can calculate that q = 5
12
:






in his project. From Proposition 10 (part 2), it can be seen that his investment would




= 0:381 claims for each state. At these prices, (25)
















in his project. To nance his investment, Proposition 11 shows that he would like to




= 0:476 claims for the bad state.
In the present example, the amount of claims desired by the entrepreneur exceeds
the amount that would be issued by the banker at the fundamental prices. Since
the worker is precluded from issuing claims by his inability to keep the promise, the
market equilibrium will therefore reect a premium price on liquid claims. Precisely,
Proposition 12 (part 2) shows that the market will clear at the price q1H satisfying





































 = 20 (1  eH)
35 + 28q1H (1  eH)
for some eH such that
eH 2
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:







[0; 1] ; if q1H = 512
1; if q1H > 512 :
The solution has eH = 0 and q1H =
5
14
: The supply and demand curves for this
market are depicted in Figure 2, where the broken curve is b (; 0) ; and the solid
curve is e (; eH) for eH 2 e (q1H) :




he would choose in an environment with surplus liquidity. On the other hand, the liq-
uidity price-premium represents an implicit subsidy for the investment of the banker.










to goods in each state. Thus,
the example obviates an interesting feature of the model: that the liquidity problem
may distort the bankers behavior in the direction of increased investment.
Although the investment that backs the securities in the model is illiquid, the
securities themselves are fully liquid in the sense that they are marketable. Indeed,
the timing of project maturities necessitates the circulation of liquid assets among
agents to e¤ect the desired transactions. This emphasizes that the securities need
not have short maturities cycles to be liquid. With respect to the real world, of
course, there are other properties that a¤ect the "marketability" of securities, and
the degree to which the analogous securities are liquid is an empirical question.
It is worth noting that the introduction of at money in some extension would
not solve the liquidity problem if it earned a rate of return below that earned by real
investment, as it would, for example, in a simple model in which agents that discount
the future are endowed with a xed stock of currency. This is because the assets that
provide liquidity are just as liquid as at money, and earn a better return. But if the
frequency of liquidity shocks is similar to the maturity cycle of investment, it seems
likely that nancially sophisticated rms would not nd access to securities markets
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inconvenient (since they may access such markets for investment nance, anyway),
so that the monetary instrument of choice for meeting these liquidity needs is more
likely to be savings deposits, CDs, T-bills, or even corporate bonds. That is, the
assumption that such instruments are su¢ ciently liquid to serve this function is
plausible.
This argument suggests that the phenomenon described here relates specically
to the e¤ect of interest-bearing inside money, rather than at money, on economic
performance. This observation may, in turn, motivate an explanation of an e¤ect
of interest-bearing inside money on output. Indeed, evidence suggests that broad
measures of money are more highly correlated with output than M1 or the monetary
base. Moreover, the nding by Friedman and Kuttner (1993) that the six-month
commercial paper rate "is superior [to the three-month T-bill rate] in capturing the
information in nancial prices that matters for the determination of real income"
may be taken as supportive of the idea that it is the whole stock of liquid liabilities,
more than just those of the government, that provide important liquidity services.
4.2 Equilibrium Liquidation of the Bankers Assets
In the previous section, I showed that the banker may choose to liquidate his
project under certain circumstances, but the intuition for this result may not be
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immediately obvious. Nevertheless, I will argue that the rationale is intuitive and
economically interesting.
In the model, liquidation of a project circumvents the need to provide incentives.
Therefore, even though the overall return from the project is lower when it is liqui-
dated, it is still possible that liquidation may put more value in the hands of outside
claims holders than could be achieved by carrying the project through. Indeed,
Proposition 10 shows that this is precisely the necessary and su¢ cient condition for
the banker to be willing to liquidate when the price of liquidity becomes extreme. In
such an environment, his private objective of expected payo¤maximization is served
by selling state 1H claims based on the liquidation value of his investment, rather
than their value at maturity.
My last example illustrates this phenomenon numerically.
Example 3. Let us reconsider the example of the previous subsection with the
simple change that now L = 6
7
> ~Rb: In this case, Lemma 8 shows that liquidation
will be optimal for the banker whenever q1H is at least qb = 13 :
Figure 3 depicts the demand correspondence of the entrepreneur, analyzed in
Example 2, together with the implied supply correspondence of the banker with the
higher liquidation value. As is apparent from the gure, the new equilibrium price is
1
3
; which is lower than it was in the previous example, and the banker now chooses to
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liquidate a small fraction of his project in the bad state. More precisely, the fraction





























































Documenting the S&L crisis in the U.S., White (1989) and others have observed
banks in nancial distress "gambling for resurrection" by choosing to undertake risky
projects when their prospects are already low. And Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)
and other authors have adequately explained the phenomenon theoretically. While
such behavior may appear to be related to that described here, closer observation re-
veals that is clearly quite di¤erent. In particular, the environment described by these
authors pre-supposes private information possessed by the bank about the quality of
its portfolio prior to the investment decision. Gambling by the bank is then adverse
to the interest of the holders of the banks liabilities. In the world described here,
there is perfect information, and liquidation, when it occurs, represents a constrained
optimum.
A more plausible historical analogy is that to episodes of liquidation by institu-
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tions under the National Banking System of the nineteenth century. In that era,
liquidity crises were relatively frequent occurrences, and liquidations by banks often
coincided with them. This was true even while the crises usually did not directly
a¤ect the banksassets. The closure of the analogy implies that, in times of the
most severe crises, banksliabilities did not garner su¢ cient faith that they could be
circulated, and redemptions necessitated asset liquidations. But given the frequency
and systematic nature of such occurrences, it dees belief that the gamble by banks
was not undertaken consciously and widely understood. That is, this failure of faith
must have been expected ex ante.
4.3 Bank Capital and Liquidity
To the extent that the endowment of the banker is closely linked to the concept
of bank capital, my model alludes to a micro-foundation for an e¤ect of bank capital
for the e¤ectiveness of the nancial system. That is, the productive capacity if the
entrepreneur is a¤ected in a coherent way by the availability of bank liabilities; and,
for a xed equilibrium interest rate, the issue of monetary liabilities by the banker
is greater in proportion to this "bank capital".
This may be seen quite simply with reference to the rst example in subsection
3.2. There the e¤ect of increasing the endowment "capital" of the bank is clearly
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exemplied by the increase in the equilibrium interest rate (decrease in the price of
liquidity) as the supply of liquidity by the banker is shifted up.
Unfortunately, the present model can do no more than hint at an interesting
connection, and no extension suitable for investigating it will be undertaken here.
4.4 Implications for Central Bank Policy
Although I have argued above that the introduction of at money would likely
be of little value in mitigating the type of problem I have discussed, it does not
automatically follow that there can be no scope for intervention by a government
authority here. As usual, this issue is sensitive to the attributes ascribed to this
entity by the theory.
It will be easily recognized that liquidity problems may be eased to the extent
that the government can issue liabilities at date 0 that will be valuable to the worker
at date 1; in e¤ect, the ability of the government to commit to such a plan coupled
with the capacity to act on it will be valuable. This discussion naturally leads one
to ponder the importance of the issue and redemption of bonds by the government.
Aspects of this issue are addressed by Holmström and Tirole (1998). But the stock
of bonds issued by the government represents a fraction of the entire stock of liquid
assets in the economy, and it is likely that some of these are suitable substitutes
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for government bonds in many circumstances. As such, it is unsatisfying for some
purposes to imagine simply that liquid assets are available at a price that is xed
exogenously.
Alternatively, the government could a¤ect aggregate liquidity merely by its com-
mitment to a¤ect the total state 1H value of the stock of liquid assets that are
available at date 0. This idea suggests some value for open market operations in
this environment; that is, the government might be imagined to increase the value
of this stock by purchasing assets in this state. By analogy, the theory described
here suggests that open market purchases will increase liquidity by enhancing the
quality of the balance sheets of agents who hold these assets. Note that this story
is fundamentally di¤erent from the money- or credit-channel models of the e¤ective-
ness of monetary policy, and it does not involve at money or any "special" status of
banks as such. In this way, it is more in line with the "bank capital channel" story
suggested by Van den Heuvel (2002).
In any case, it is clear that study of these issues requires one to take a stand on
exactly what powers the central authority has that agents do not. I will conclude
this paper without having done so.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have presented a model of entrepreneurial nance by hetero-
geneous producers in general equilibrium. Entrepreneurs issue securities in order
to nance an initial investment, but they must also make arrangements to insure
against a possible liquidity shock. Moral hazard on the part of the entrepreneur
necessitates that he retain a share of the project so that he has an incentive not to
abuse his position. But ensuring access to capital at the necessary time is hindered,
in addition, by the lack of commitment on the part of other agents. Since the moral
hazard problem remains even after the liquidity shock, an uninsured entrepreneur
may be forced to abandon a project that has positive economic value. The lack of
commitment by outsiders implies that they may be unwilling ex post to make good
on promises exchanged for securities that turn out to have low value.
To mitigate the problem, the entrepreneur will desire to hold securities that have
high value ex post. Thus, securities that have value in the bad state provide liquidity
services owing to market frictions, and they may merit a price premium ex ante.
It seems natural to try to interpret the issuers of securities that provide liquidity
services as "banks". This interpretation leads to the conclusion that broad denitions
of "money" in particular, interest-bearing liabilities may be a powerful determi-
nant of the liquidity of an economy. This interpretation seems to be consistent with
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the stylized fact that broader denitions of money are more highly correlated with
output than the monetary base.
But it is important to recognize a complementary interpretation that suggests
that the stock of assets that provide liquidity services may be broader still. That is,
there is nothing in the model that should lead one to associate the liquid liabilities
of the banker more with bank deposits than with CDs or even the bonds of non-
nancial corporations. An investigation contrasting the role of these instruments for
the provision of liquidity seems an interesting avenue for future research.
Though the mechanism by which liquidity becomes scarce has been adopted in
its essence from Holmström and Tirole (1998), this paper contributes to the extant
theory by recognizing how the introduction of heterogeneity changes the environment
fundamentally. In particular, the innovation allows the use by agents of private
liabilities backed by investment for their liquidity needs. In turn, this implies that
the stock of liquid assets inherits the elasticity properties of the investment itself.
In this environment, one may interpret the endogenous emergence of "banks" in a
simple and fully-specied perfect-information economy. I believe that the important
properties of the model can be extended in a straightforward way to a dynamic
economy, facilitating the study of the interaction between nancial and real business
cycles.
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6 Proofs of the Results
Proof of Lemma 5. First suppose that
 
cb; Ib; b; Bb

is a feasible policy, and







follows. Let ~cb0 = 0; ~I





b=~Ib and ~cb2s = c
b
2s +R
b for each s:
Let the remaining elements of the new policy be identical to the old. Now it is easy
to check that the new policy is feasible if the old one is. Moreover, subtracting the





that the new one is an improvement, a contradiction.
To see that the bankers incentive compatibility constraints must bind, let (cb; Ib;



















b=~Ib for each s; and let ~cb2 = c
b
2   + q1q2Rb
and ~cb2s = c
b
2s + q1q2R
b for s 6= : Let the remaining elements of the new policy
be identical to the old. Now it is easy to check (using q1q2  ) that the new
policy is feasible if the old one is. Moreover, subtracting the payo¤ under the old
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Finally, suppose that the feasible policy has cb1 =  > 0: Then construct the
tilde policy with ~cb1 = 0; ~I









the other elements be as in the original policy. Again the feasibility and superiority
of the new policy can be veried.
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose that (ce; Ie; e; Be) is a feasible policy, and that
















H = 1   (1  eH) Ie=~Ie: Dene
the remaining elements of the new policy as in the old. Now it is easy to check that
the new policy is feasible if the old one is. Moreover, subtracting the payo¤ to the
entrepreneur of the old policy from that generated by the new one gives
 [(1  )Re   1] > 0;
where the inequality follows from (22) :
(Surpluses for the other states can be excluded in the manner of the proof of
Lemma 5.)
58
Proof of Corollary 7. From the budget constraints of the banker, one has the















(The strict inequality follows from the fact that Ib > 0:) Suppose by way of contra-
diction that q1L > 1  : It is immediate from Proposition 2 that Bw1L = 0; and from
the budget constraints of the entrepreneur and Lemma 6, it can be seen that





1L < 0; contradicting the market clearing conditions. Thus, it must
be that q1L = 1  :
Next suppose that q2s > 1; then Proposition 2 gives Bw2s = 0; and from the
budget constraints of the entrepreneur and Lemma 6, it can be seen that
Be2s =  Ie (1  es) ~Re  0: (26)
Since Bi2s  0; i 2 fb; eg ; market clearing implies that Bi2s = 0 for i 2 fb; eg : Since
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Ib > 0; this implies that bs = 1: From the rst-order (n.s.) conditions for (24) ;
it is straightforward to show that bs > 0 only if q1 >  for some  2 fH;Lg :9
Suppose rst that  = s; that is, q1s > s: Then Proposition 2 gives B
w
1s = 0; so that
Be1s =  Bb1s > 0: Now from the budget constraints of the entrepreneur and Lemma
6, one has





and it must be that Ie (1  es) > 0: But now (26) contradicts the implication shown
above that Be2s = 0:
Next suppose that  is not the same as s: Again Proposition 2 gives that Bw1 = 0;
and Ie (1  e) > 0: This implies that the entrepreneur liquidates his project in the
good state, which can easily be seen (e.g., from the rst-order conditions for the
problem) to contradict optimality.
Proof of Lemma 8. The necessary and su¢ cient rst-order Kuhn-Tucker condi-
























 0 if b > 0
 0 if b < 1;
9Writing the Kuhn-Tucker condition for bs and plugging in q1 =  for each , the criterion
reduces to L 1; this quantity is always negative, implying that bs = 0 by the Kuhn-Tucker theorem.
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where I have imposed the result of Corollary 7 that q2s = 1 in equilibrium. I have
already argued that the term in braces must be positive for all b 2 [0; 1]2 at equi-
librium prices, so result 1 is obvious by inspection.
Now consider the case that ~Rb < L: using the result of Corollary 7 that q1L = 1 ;































































implies that bH = 1: But inspection













10To show this, rst show thatQL is decreasing in 
b











 QH (1) QL (0) : Then evaluating the RHS, it is easy to see that it must be negative.
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Thus, it cannot be that bL > 0 in equilibrium, proving the rst part of result 2: Now
evaluating QH (0), the critical condition for 
b
H > 0 can be restated as q1H  qb; and
the optimality of the rule bH 2 b (q1H) follows directly.
Proof of Lemma 9. The function to be maximized by e is strictly quasiconcave,
so that the rst-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for opti-



















 0 if e > 0
 0 if e < 1:
I have already argued that the expression in square brackets is positive, so that
L = 0 implies immediately that 
e
L = 0: Imposing this result in the condition for 
b
H
and using the fact that q1L = 1   (Corollary 7), the cuto¤ price q may be derived
by simplifying and solving for the value of q1H that makes the left-hand side criterion
exactly equal to zero.
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Figure 3. Supply and Demand of Liquidity in the Parameterization of Example 3.
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Chapter II
Enforcing Contracts by Imperfect
Permanent Exclusion from Assets
Markets
8 Introduction
The dening characteristic of a collateral asset is that its ownership is contractible,
and that the asset is susceptible to conscation in the event of a breach of contract.
In many models of economic equilibrium, the introduction of a collateral asset can
be analyzed simply by redening one or more market clearing conditions to reect
additional resources from "outside".11 This is a simple and intuitively appealing
notion, and the e¤ects on the economy are likely to be equally clear and intuitive.
But it is not clear from this denition what it would mean for an asset not to be
"collateralizable".
The innovation of this paper is a rigorous micro-foundation for the nature of
economies with assets that are not collateralizable. I study a one-good, pure-exchange
economy with limited enforcement of intertemporal contracts in which defaulting
11In stochastic economies with a complete set of contingent claims markets, for example, collat-
eral can be thought of as augmenting the aggregate stock of claims in each market in a manner
conformable state-by-state with the dividend of the asset in that state; that is, the asset is "outside
wealth" that a¤ords negative net issue of claims by "insiders".
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agents cannot be fully excluded from participation in asset markets. Rather, a
tradable non-collateral asset exists that cannot be conscated, and agents cannot
be restricted from trading this asset in spot markets. Thus, while banished from
other markets, agents can still self-insure by accumulating and decumulating the
non-collateral asset through trade after having reneged on a nancial contract.
At the level of quantitative analysis, the assumption, introduced by Kehoe and
Levine (1993), that defaulting agents can be excluded entirely from intertemporal
trade has proved to be quite restrictive, and a growing branch of the literature has
sought to relax it in satisfying ways. Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Seppälä (1999)
study economies in which agents can continue to produce and consume capital in
"autarky", but they may not buy or sell capital or nancial assets. These models
capture the fact that agents have alternative ways to smooth their consumption,
making life after default less painful than it would be otherwise. Lustig (2001, 2003)
assumes that default involves surrender of an agents holdings of a collateral asset,
but that agents may rejoin the assets markets immediately after a "bankruptcy".
Thus, Lustig concedes the reality that the worst punishment that can be invented
by society is not applied in fact. Like those of Kehoe and Perri and Seppälä, agents
in my economy retain a special part of their accumulated portfolio through default;
and, like those of Lustig, agents may trade after having defaulted.
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I view this paper as drawing also on the literature on consumption smoothing
through precautionary saving in economies with incomplete markets. In such set-
tings, Telmer (1993) and Lucas (1994) (and others) have shown that accumulation
of a single non-contingent asset in su¢ cient supply may a¤ord a great deal of con-
sumption smoothing in general equilibrium. This fact suggests that default in the
economy I have described may be very attractive. Of course, prices faced by de-
faulting agents may be di¤erent from either those implied by rst-best risk-sharing,
or general equilibrium with incomplete markets. Rather, prices are determined by
institutions that require that default must be (weakly) the less attractive option; if
not, then the equilibrium is broken by agentschoice to default.
The equilibration mechanism in the model is capable of inducing a great deal
of volatility to the price of the non-collateral asset, and to other endogenous prices
and quantities in the model. Intuitively, greater ownership of the non-collateral
asset expands an agents payo¤ should he choose to default. But this default is,
by denition, an out-of-equilibrium occurrence. In the language of the literature
on repeated games, the "punishment" for default becomes less harsh with expanded
ownership of the non-collateral asset. As in that literature, the net e¤ect can be that
the set of actions that can be sustained in an equilibrium is reduced. In the present
setting, this means that some contractual promises lose their credibility, enforcement
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constraints become tighter, and the scope for unsecured nance is reduced.
To assess the quantitative properties of the model, I follow much of the macro-
economic literature in documenting asset pricing implications of a calibrated version
of economy. To facilitate comparison with previous work, I adopt the calibration
framework of Alvarez and Jermann (2001) and followed also by Lustig (2003). I
interpret the non-collateral asset as "equity" in these experiments.12
In the next section, I describe the model. The Analysis section described the
relevant features of equilibrium and the asset pricing implications. The fourth sec-
tion described the computational algorithm, the calibration, and the results of my
numerical experiments. The last section concludes.
9 Model
9.1 Basic Environment
Time is discrete and innite, t = 0; 1; 2:::
There are I types of agents indexed by i 2 I: Each type is representative of a
set of identical agents in a continuum of measure one. (I will conduct most of my
analysis under the special assumption that #I = 2:)
12Tellarini (2000) similarly interprets capital as the equity for in a model of asset pricing in a real
business cycles model.
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Uncertainty is characterized by an exogenous Markovian random variable st gov-
erned by probability measure : I assume that st takes values in a nite set S. I
write st := (s0; s1; :::; st) for a (nite) history. I write  (st) for the probability of his-
tory st obtaining from the initial state s0; taken as given. The probability of history
s following from st  s will be written as  (s jst) : (Note that it is no abuse of
notation under these assumptions to write  (s0jst) for  (st; s0jst) :)
There is a single unit of a single good available in each period in each state in
the economy. (I will show below how the apparatus I construct may be used to
study an economy with permanent growth innovations.) The good is useful only
for consumption and only within the period of its dating. Writing ci (st) for the
consumption of agent i in history st, resource feasibility in the economy refers to the













There is a single unit of each of two perfectly divisible real assets in the economy.
Agent is ownership of the rst (second) asset at the beginning of history st is denoted
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for all st; and the analogous conditions for b (st 1) : The initial distribution, say
(k (s 1) ; b (s 1)) ; is given at history s0: Properties unique to each asset are discussed
in detail in the next subsection.
The good is assigned to agents at the beginning of each period as follows. First,
to each agent i accrues a personal endowment wi (st) : Throughout, I will assume that
wi (st) = (1  ) "i (st) ; where  2 [0; 1] and "i (st) > 0 for each i; and
P
i "
i (st) = 1:
Although wi (st) has no literally idiosyncratic component in our setting with a nite
number of agent types, it is in keeping with the literature to interpret it as analogous
to idiosyncratic income.


















In this paper, I will restrict attention to the special case that yk (st) =  and
yb (s
t) = (1  ) for all histories st; where  2 [0; 1] : The parameter  is thus the
share of aggregate income that is attached to transferable dividend generating assets.
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In the middle ("market") phase of each period, agents may participate in com-
petitive markets for the real assets, k and b; and for state-contingent ("nancial")
claims to goods payable in the market phase of the subsequent period. I write q (st)
(respectively, r (st)) for the price at st of a unit of the rst (second) asset, and I
write p (s0jst) for the price at st of a claim to a unit of the good in history (st; s0) :
(The consumption good in the period of contracting serves as the numeraire for each
price.) Writing ai (st; st+1) for is purchase at st of claims to the st+1 good, the budget






































































Agents consume at the end of each period. Each agent acts at st in a time
consistent manner to maximize the current discounted value of his utility from con-
sumption. I allow subjective discounting of payo¤ received after the current period
to depend on the current state st: Precisely, let the discount factor applied in state
st to payo¤ received in subsequent periods be  (st), where  : S ! (0; 1) : It will be
convenient to write t (s
 ) :=
Q 1







for   t;
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and, in particular, t (s
t+1) =  (st) :
13























for some  > 0; and I interpret  = 1 to mean that u (c) = ln c:
9.2 Enforcement Technology
Obligations of individual agents to deliver goods inherent in their issue (sale) of
claims are fullled only voluntarily, where default can be punished only as follows.
Upon the decision at the beginning of history st of an agent i to abrogate contingent
claims obligations, his holdings of asset 2 are conscated, and he is immediately
and forever thereafter banned from participating in the nancial (contingent claims)
markets and the market for asset 2. It is assumed, however, that his holdings of asset
1 and his ability to trade that asset in spot markets cannot be revoked. The agent
13The value of this state contingent discounting will be apparent when I interpret the economy
as one with aggregate growth.
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retains ki (st 1) and his ability to buy and sell the asset at his will in present and
future histories.
Since agents are non-atomic, the decision of a single agent to default on obligations
to supply goods to the market has no e¤ect on aggregate resources. Moreover, I will
restrict attention to equilibria wherein agents choose not to default on contracts if
they have a weak incentive to comply with them; and where the defection of any
single agent (or nite number of agents) is ignored in terms of the behavior of the
others.
I assume that market participants, acting with perfecting information, prevent
the choosing by any agent of a portfolio that would leave him with a (strict) desire to
default in some subsequent history. This mechanism, together with my assumptions
about the behavior of other agents following a default, implies that the payo¤ that
any agent expects at any continuation must (weakly) dominate that the agent could
achieve for himself were he to commit a default.
The default payo¤ problem of an agent i with i shares of asset 1 at the beginning




































and a non-negativity constraint ̂






and the price system q are taken as given.14 I will say that the tuple (c; k; b; a; p; q; r)














for all st > s0 and i:
The market payo¤ problem of agent i at history st when i has not previously
defaulted can now be dened as that of maximizing (30) subject to the budget
constraints (29) for s  st; the enforcement constraints (31) for s+1 > st; and



















Tt and the price processes are
taken as given, and the agent chooses the continuations of the processes (ci; ki; ai)
relevant to his continuation payo¤.
I will refer to asset 1 as the "non-collateral" asset, and asset 2 as the "collateral"
assets.
14I leave the dependence of the function V i on the price system q implicit in my notation.
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9.3 Denition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a tuple of a real allocation (c; k; b), prices (q; p; r) ; and contin-
gent claims holdings a satisfying the following conditions.
1. For each i and for each st; the relevant continuation of (ci; ki; bi; a) solves is
market problem at st, given initial conditions ki (st 1) ; bi (st 1) ; and ai (st) :




























= 0 for each s0 2 S.
9.4 An Economy with Aggregate Growth
As explained by Alvarez and Jermann (2000,2001), an economy with stochastic
aggregate endowment innovations can be transformed into one tting the description
above as follows.
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Consider economy (di¤erent from the one described in this paper) in which the
aggregate endowment at history st is 	(st) :=
Qt
=0  (s ), where s
t is now assumed
to follow ̂; a probability measure with the properties ascribed to  above. Suppose
further that agents discount future utility by some constant discount factor ̂ 2 (0; 1)










Now by dening  () and  () to be consistent with






for each s, and





for each s and s0; an economy with the properties described previously can be studied
with the interpretation that ci (st) ; wi (st) and rj (st) are shares (i.e., fractions) of the
aggregate quantity 	(st) for each st: In what follows, I will show how equilibrium
prices for my economy may similarly be transformed to coincide with those of an
equilibrium of the economy with growth.
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10 Analysis
Because of the dependence of the default payo¤ functions on expectations about
future endogenous variables, the equilibrium allocations cannot easily be summarized
as solutions of a central planning problem. In this section, I develop a character-
ization of a class of recursive equilibria based on an analysis of the decentralized
problem. In the next section, I show how equilibria may be computed by an algo-
rithm based on rst-order conditions.
For the remainder of the paper, I restrict attention to economies with two types
of agents, I = f1; 2g :
10.1 Recursive Equilibria
I begin by documenting the form of the rst-order necessary conditions for the
market payo¤problem of agent i:Writing 0 (s
t) i (st) (st) for the multiplier on the
st enforcement constraint, the Lagrangian function for this problem may be written














































plus the sum of the budget constraints weighted by another Lagrange multiplier.










































































































































































Suppose that the inequality were strict for some st. In this case, it is clear that
no agent would hold the collateral asset at st, since replacing the portfolio policy




satisfying ~bi (st) = 0 and ~bi ( ) = bi ( )
for  6= st; and ~ai (s0jst) = ai (s0jst) + [r (st; s0) + yb (s0)] bi (st) for each s0; and
~ai ( ) = ai (s0j ) for  6= st is easily seen to a¤ord an improved consumption
stream. Thus it is seen that equilibrium must have (35) holding with equality. More-
over, at equality, agents are indi¤erent about the ownership of the collateral asset.
The following proposition summarizes and extends this idea.





















and for any stochastic process  adapted to  with  (st) 2 [0; 1] for each st; there
exists an equilibrium with b1 (st) =  (st) :
This result points to the nature of collateral itself: a claim on an agent who holds
collateral is as good as a claim to the collateral itself. It can be interpreted to hold
in the standard frictionless setting of Arrow-Debreu economies for any asset that
is redundant in the sense of spanning the uncertainty in the economy. It implies
that no trade in the collateral asset is ever necessary. While familiar, this feature of
the standard paradigm is counterfactual; the volume of trade in real asset markets
is robust, and the fact that real world trade is (even moderately) costly belies the
notion that such trade is unnecessary for agents to achieve their desired allocations.
The more interesting feature of the present model will be seen in the failure of this
proposition applied to non-collateral assets.






1 + ~2 (st; s0)

1 + ~1 (st; s0)
 u0 (c2 (st; s0))
u0 (c1 (st; s0))
:
Now dene  (st) by
 (st)




and note that equilibrium denes a stochastic process  whose evolution is governed
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1 + ~1 (st; s0)

1 +  (st) ~1 (st; s0) + (1   (st)) ~2 (st; s0)
: (36)
It is clear that the process  pins down the consumption processes of the two
agents (using the binding resource constraint (27)). The following proposition implies
that it pins down the multipliers ~1 and ~2 as well whenever the dividend paid to
collateral assets is positive.
Lemma 14 Suppose that  < 1: In any equilibrium (c; k; b; a; p; q; r) ; for each history
st; at most one agents enforcement constraint may bind; therefore, at most one of
the multipliers ~1 (st) and ~2 (st) can be positive.
Proof. The hypothesis that  < 1 implies that some agent i has more wealth at st







































































+  (1  )
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a contradiction.) But now it is easy to see that this agent can obtain a more pre-
ferred consumption stream in the market than in default; in particular, it su¢ ces
to note that the constraints of the market problem a¤ord a consumption stream
that is strictly greater than that under an optimal default policy at st and identical
thereafter. Thus, is enforcement constraint cannot be binding at st:
As mentioned above, the lemma implies that  (st) and  (st; s0) uniquely identify
the multipliers ~1 (st) and ~2 (st) through the transition relationship (36) whenever
 < 1: From the rst-order conditions and Proposition 13 above, it is also clear that
 pins down the prices p and r as well under these circumstances.
Henceforth, I will restrict attention to the case that  < 1; and I will study an
equilibrium that can be characterized recursively as follows.
Dene the state of the economy by xt = ( (st 1) ; k1 (st 1) ; st) 2 X := [0; 1] 
[0; 1] S; and let ci (xt) 2 R+; ~ki (xt) 2 [0; 1] ; ~i (xt) 2 R+; q (xt) 2 R+; and
~ (xt) 2 [0; 1] be functions on X: Dene a transition function on X by
 (xt; st+1) :=

~ (xt) ; ~k




p (s0jxt) :=  (st)













Dene the function ai : X ! R as the solution to the functional equation
ai (xt)  ci (xt) + q (xt) ~ki (xt)  wi (st)  [q (xt) + ] ki +
X
s0
p (s0jxt) ai ( (xt; s0)) :



















di + q (x) ̂
i  wi (s) + [q (x) + ] ̂i
and ̂


















ĉi + q (x) k̂i +
X
s0










and k̂i  0; where the maximization is over choice variables





Now I will say that the functions

ci; ~ki; ~i; q; ~

constitute a recursive equilibrium
if the following conditions hold.
1. For each x = (; k; s) 2 X;

ci (x) ; ~ki (x) ; ai ( (x; ))

solves the program
dened by W i (ki; ai (x) jx), where k1 = k and k2 = 1   k; and ~i ( (x; s0)) is
the Lagrange multiplier on the enforcement constraint for s0 in the denition
of W i (ki; a (x) jx) :
2. For each x 2 X;
P
i c
i (x) = 1:
3. For each x 2 X;
P
i
~ki (x) = 1:




1 + ~1 (x)

1 + ~1 (x) + (1  ) ~2 (x)
:
10.2 Asset Pricing
To gain an intuition for the mechanism that gives rise to equilibrium prices in the
present model, and to understand how that mechanism is distinct from alternative
models, it is useful to begin by reviewing the pricing of a generic redundant asset
in the canonical environment of frictionless complete markets. In this context, a
representative agent may be thought to choose consumption and an asset portfolio.
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The key assumption (retained here) is that, among other asset available for purchase
or issue, a complete set of Arrow-Debreu state-contingent securities is o¤ered. The








































t) accounts for is purchase of (redundant) asset j in history st; and the
(possibly random) return of that asset is Rj (st; s0) in history (st; s0) : (Here, I have
considered for simplicity assets that live for only one period and then expire.) In
the frictionless paradigm (without enforcement constraints), optimization gives rise























u0 (ci (st; s0))
u0 (ci (st))
:
(Equilibrium and the Euler equation for claims to goods in history (st; s0) imply that
m is independent of i:) If asset f if "risk free" so that Rf (st; s0) = Rf (st) for all s0;
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t; s0) (s0js) :


















































Here, the right-hand side is the product of the conditional expectations of the pricing
kernel and the rate of return on asset j; plus the conditional covariance of the two.














































This is a familiar representation of the excess return attached to asset j over the rate
of return on the risk-free asset, and the familiar interpretation is that asset j will
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earn a positive "risk premium" if its return covaries negatively with the marginal
utility growth of the representative agent  i.e., positively with the growth of his
consumption. This explanation is incorporated as a piece of the explanation for the
observed premium return of the market portfolio over (essentially) riskless bonds.
But the numerical value of this explanation turns out to be tiny if agents preferences
are of the standard form under an assumption about the degree of risk aversion of
agents that is plausible. This is the "high equity premium puzzle".
On the other hand, if one is willing to entertain a degree of risk aversion high
enough to account for the market risk premium in this model, then an alternative
puzzle appears. High degrees of risk aversion give rise to a risk free rate Rf (st)
that is inconsistent with low historical observations. This phenomenon is sometimes
thought of independently as the "low risk-free rate puzzle".
In an environment with commitment constraints (like the one considered here),
the analysis above must be augmented by accounting for the possibility that agents
portfolio choices may be constrained. In this case, the asset pricing kernel applicable



















:=  (s) ~i
 
st; s0
 u0 (ci (st; s0))
u0 (ci (st))
;
and ~i (st; s0) represents a non-negative Lagrange multiplier associated with the en-
forcement constraint applying to history (st; s0).







































































Thus, the stochastic relationship between borrowing constraints and asset returns
enters into the mix. Now it can be seen that negative covariance between the term
vi (st; s0) and the asset return exerts a positive e¤ect on the risk premium associated
with the asset.
Alvarez and Jermann (2001) show how this e¤ect plays out numerically. In their
calibration, the sign as well as the magnitude of the risk premium depend critically
on whether or not the conditional distribution of private endowments is more volatile
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in recessions. When the standard deviation of "i is assumed to increase in recessions,
they nd a positive risk premium; when the reverse is assumed to occur, the risk
premium is negative.
For the non-collateral asset, the present environment exhibits an additional term
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 (s) ~i
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st; s0






















The new term i (st; s0) has a structure like that of vi (st; s0) ; except that agent is
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in the denition of the latter is replaced
by the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution that would apply were he to
default in state (st; s0) : This term embodies a constraint faced by agent i by expanded
opportunity in default as a result of holding a larger quantity of the non-collateral
asset. Intuitively, if the agent increases his holdings at st, he increases his default
payo¤ in state (st; s0). In the states (st; s0) for which his enforcement constraint
binds, the increase in default payo¤ reduces the amount of debt that he can credibly
promise to repay. Although it is a complex matter to anticipate the e¤ect of the new
term in the pricing kernel for the implied return premium on non-collateral assets, it
is unambiguously positive. In the next section, I study the quantitative implications
of the model, and I compare it to other results in the literature by interpreting the




The algorithm I use to compute a recursive equilibrium of the economy is a
signicant extension of that used by Kehoe and Perri (2002).
The algorithm is an iterative one based on improvement from an initial starting
guess. For the latter, I begin by computing, for each x = (; k; s) ; the allocation
ci0 (x) ;
~ki0 (x) ; ~
i
0 (x) ; q0 (x) ; ~0 (x)

and the transition rule 0 (x; ) that would ap-
ply if the enforcement constraints did not need to be imposed i.e., the rst-best
allocation. I let ~W i0 (x) be the payo¤ to i under this allocation dened by the solution
to







~W i0 (0 (x; s
0)) (s0js) :
For the defection payo¤, one can use standard recursive procedures to compute
the payo¤ for each x = (; k; s) of having capital  in the incomplete markets setting
under the rst-best price system q0; when transitions on the aggregate state abide
by the transition rule 0: However, it is necessary to take care that the enforcement
constraints can be satised by some feasible allocation for each x: As a matter of
practice, I have found it su¢ cient to consider starting values for V i0 (jx) equal to
the function just described minus some xed positive quantity. I have found it
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useful also to keep track of the solutions to the problem dened by V i0 (jx) ; say




. In solving the equations that follow, the need to approximate
the derivative V i0 of an approximated function is alleviated by using the envelope
theorem result




[q0 (x) + yk (s)] :
For conceptual clarity, I have retained the V i0 notation below.
For each x = (; k; s) 2 X = [0; 1] [0; 1] S, I rst compute provisional values
for the next iterate

ci1 (x) ;
~ki1 (x) ; ~
i
1 (x) ; q1 (x) ; ~1 (x)

by assuming that ~i1 (x) = 0
for each i; and ~1 (x) = ; i.e., as if neither of the agentsenforcement constraints
were binding for state x: These values satisfy the following conditions:
~1 (x)u











ci1 (1 (x; s
0))
 
1 + ~i0 (1 (x; s
0))

[q0 (1 (x; s





~i0 (1 (x; s
0)) ~V i0

~ki1 (x) j1 (x; s0)

 (s0js)
 0; = 0 if ~ki1 (x) > 0
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for each i; X
i
ci1 (x) = 1; (39)
and X
i
~ki1 (x) = 1; (40)
where 1 (x; s
0) = (; k11 (x) ; s
0) :
Next, I check the enforcement constraints for this choice. The payo¤ to i of














In Kehoe and Perri, the default payo¤ of agent i is an exogenous function of
~ki1 (x) ; in the present environment, however, the default payo¤ is co-determined
with the price system, so that it cannot be calculated independently. While the form
of the function V i1 (jx) is unknown a priori, provisional choices for consumption and
savings of an agent who defaults at x; say di1 (x) and 
i
1 (x) can be derived. In state
x; the distribution of the non-collateral asset is described by k1 = k and k2 = 1  k;
and the proposed allocation suggests that the price of the non-collateral asset follows
q1 (x) in the current period and q0 () in the subsequent one. In this case, di1 (x) and
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i1 (x) must satisfy
di1 (x) + q1 (x)
i
1 (x) = w












i1 (x) j1 (x; s0)

 (s0js)  0; = 0 if i1 (x) > 0:
(42)



















i1 (x) j1 (x; s0)

 (s0js) :
If these are satised for each i; I dene ~W i1 (x) by the left-hand side for each i; and I
record the provisional values as the new starting allocation for this state x: If the con-
straint is satised for agent 1 (for example) but not for agent 2,15 then I set ~11 (x) = 0;
and I solve for the values

ci1 (x) ;




~21 (x) ; d
2




15Recall that I have assumed that only one of the constraints binds at a time in the equilibrium
considered.
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that satisfy (37)-(40) ; (41)-(42) for i = 2, (43) with equality for i = 2, and
~1 (x) =

1 + (1  ) ~21 (x)
; (44)




~k11 (x) ; s
0

: The solution denes a new alloca-
tion for the next iteration for this x: I take ~W i1 (x) by evaluating the Left-hand side
of (43) for each i under this allocation.
If I had found instead that the constraint is violated for agent 1, I would perform
the analogous calculations by switching the appropriate indices, except that (44) is




1 + ~11 (x)

1 + ~11 (x)
;
Finally, I compute the updated default payo¤ functions V i1 (jx) by nding for
each  in an appropriately chosen subset of R+ the solution


























d̂i1 + q1 (x) ̂
i
1 = w













, a transition rule 1; value functions ~W
i
1 and






: I then compare them to the analogous
starting values to assess convergence. If a satisfactory degree of convergence has been
achieved the updates represent my approximation of the solution; otherwise, I take
the new values in the role of the starting values and repeat the iteration.
For the numerical implementation of the algorithm, I take a nite grid on the
state space, and I use tensor product splines to approximate the functions. Because
(presumably) of the presence of constraints that bind only occasionally, I have found
that using splines that are linear in the dimensions of  and k work best.16 Because of
the strict concavity of V i in ; I have obtained good results by allowing this function
to be quadratic in this dimension.
16K-P also use linear splines to compute equilibria for their economy.
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11.2 Calibration
For comparison with previous results on asset pricing in economies with limited
enforcement, I adopt a calibration strategy in the framework of Alvarez and Jermann
(2001). This framework consists in matching ten moments in the data, identied as
M1-M10.
The exogenous state space consists of four elements, S = f1; 2; 3; 4g : I assume
that the aggregate endowment grows at rate  (s) in state s; where
 (1) =  (2) =  e; and  (3) =  (4) =  r;
with  e >  r: States 1 and 2 are expansions, and states 3 and 4 are recessions.
Individual income shares are







for a = e; r; and "2 = 1   "1: Agent 1 receives a high share of the
aggregate income in states 1 and 3; agent 2 receives the high share in states 2 and 4.
The Markov transition matrix is assumed to treat agents symmetrically, so that
the matrix can be characterized by six parameters: the probability of switch from
expansion to recession, the probability of switch from recession back to expansion,
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and a probability of switching from low to high income conditional on the current
and the prior aggregate state.
The properties of the aggregate endowment process are pinned down by four
moments, M1-M4, which I hold xed throughout the analysis. These pin down the
function  and the rst two parameters of the stochastic matrix.
M1: The rst -order serial correlation of  (s) is  0:14: This is in accord with
Mehra and Prescott (1985).
M2: The ratio of the unconditional probability of expansion to that of recession
is 2.65. This moment is introduced by Alvarez and Jermann, and reects date from
the NBER for 1889-1991.
M3: The expectation of  is 1:0183 (Mehra and Prescott (1985)).
M4: The standard deviation of  is 0:0357 (3:57%) (Mehra and Prescott (1985).
The remaining moments describe the individual income shares. To facilitate
comparison to existing studies, and reecting the fact that the uncertainty inherent
in idiosyncratic income is less well understood, I will compute the model under an
array of alternative assumptions about the stochastic nature of the income shares.
The moments to be matched by the process as the following ones.
M5: The unconditional standard deviation of the log of the income share, ": This
value is of rst-order importance in calibration of limited enforcement economies. In
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the present setting, a high value makes access to nancial markets more valuable,
because it allows agents to tailor their insurance contracts to smooth this volatility in
their income. Similarly, a high value of this moment can make rst-best risk sharing
enforceable.
M6: The rst-order serial correlation of the log of the income share, ": High serial
correlation in the time-series of an agents income share reduces the amount of risk-
sharing accomplished by pure nance in my model. This is because, in the ergodic
distribution in an equilibrium, the agent with the high income tends to be making
transfers to the low income agent. If high income today implies a high probability
of high income in the future, defaulting on these transfer obligations tends to look
pretty attractive, even when it comes at the expense of foregoing insurance against
the (small) possibility of reduced future income.
M7: The ratio of the cross-sectional dispersion of the shares in recessions vr to











(It is worth noting that setting vr=ve = 1; as is done in the literature following
Alvarez and Jermann (2001), is equivalent in this environment to setting "eh = "rh;
this relationship holds in each of the parameterizations I study.)
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M8: Ratio of standard deviations of income shares in recession to that in expan-




Std (ln "1 (st+1) j (st+1) =  r;  (st) =  e)
Std (ln "1 (st+1) j (st+1) =  e;  (st) =  e)
:
The important aspect of M8 and M9 is that they determine the volatility of individ-
ual endowment income in expansions verses recessions. This feature is of rst-order
importance in theory surrounding the equity premium (as discussed above). Impor-
tant empirical studies have veried that recessions o¤er more volatility, an important
ingredient in explaining the risk premium.18 This feature seems su¢ cient in extant
models for the sign of the risk premium. A task before the researchers is to build
models that explain the magnitude of that e¤ect.
M9: Ratio of standard deviations of income shares in recession to that in expan-




Std (ln "1 (st+1) j (st+1) =  r;  (st) =  r)
Std (ln "1 (st+1) j (st+1) =  e;  (st) =  r)
:
M10: The ratio of the standard deviation of the income shares conditional on
17For M8 and M9, A-J use the notation r0e to describe what I have dened as er:






Std (ln "1 (st+1) j (st) =  r)
Std (ln "1 (st+1) j (st) =  r)
:
Alvarez and Jermann (2001) discuss the e¤ect of this moment for explaining the term
premium. I have not been concerned with this feature of the model.
The remaining parameters of the model calibration determine agentspreferences,
the share of assets in income, and the share of collateral in assets. Preference pa-
rameters are chosen primarily to accord with convention, and varied to assess the
sensitively of the model to specication changes. Throughout, the momentary utility
function is held to be logarithmic, and the discount factor is at least 0.95.
Treatments are chosen to investigate three primary e¤ects. First, I vary the
volatility of the endowment process. Second, I assess the importance of the share of
collateral in assets. Third, I vary the discount factor within a conventional range to
see how well the model can match the moments of interest.
Parameters of the Idiosyncratic Income Process:
M5 (See below) M8 1.88
M6 0.75 M9 1.88
M7 1 M10 0.95
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11.3 Data
The following table summarizes Mehra and Prescotts (1985) data on the equity
premium and the risk-free rate for the U.S. for the period 1889-1978. The implied
value of Sharpes ratio is 0.37.
Mehra and Prescott (1985) observed that the conventional model of macroeco-
nomic equilibrium with complete markets is unable to approximate this data in sim-
ulations for parameters that are economically reasonable. Comparing this data with
that from the simulations of rst-besteconomies in the tables below is suggestive
of their conclusions.
Statistic Average Std Deviation
Return on Equity 6.98% 16.54
Return on Essentially Risk-Free securities 0.80% 5.67
Equity Premium 6.18% 16.67
11.4 Results
Figures 1 and 2 below show the computed transition rules ~ (; k; s) and ~k1 (; k; s)
for di¤erent values of k: The at parts of each plot indicate the regions where the
enforcement constraints bind. The lower () plateau of each manifold has agent 1s
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constraint binding; the upper one (higher ) is where agent 2s constraint binds. In
the region between, the constraints do not bind; for states (; k; s) in this region,
~ (; k; s) = :
Figures 3 and 4 plot a simulated time-series. The rst shows the state variables
(where s 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g is normalized by 1 + 0:025s) for 100 periods. Here it can be
seen how agent 1s wealth (proxied by the endogenous state variables,  and k) grows
in states in which his endowment is high (s 2 f1; 3g); and falls when it is low. This
model is distinguished from the enforcement constraints model with perfect exclusion
from assets markets by the gradual adjustment of the weighting : The intuition for
the slower adjustment is that possession of non-collateral capital acts as a brake (a
real impediment, as opposed to merely a nancial one) on the speed of adjustment
of an agents wealth. This impedes risk sharing, because the wealthy agent has the
physical ability to attenuate changes in his wealth.
Intuitively, it can be thought that an agent with signicant non-collateral asset
holdings would like to sell more of this asset than he is able to when his income falls.
Unfortunately, the agent to whom he would sell the asset can only purchase larger
quantities of the asset by leveraging future income. But holding more of the non-
collateral asset while taking on more debt creates conicting incentives, inhibiting
the arrangement.
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The volatility of consumption and non-collateral asset holdings is apparent in the
simulated time-series. It is a virtue of the model that the distribution of the non-
collateral asset matters in terms of the amount of risk sharing that can be achieved.
The volatility of the idiosyncratic component of the income process has a non-
monotone e¤ect on the moments of interest. While higher idiosyncratic volatility
in income would be expected to carry through to consumption, it makes state-
contingent insurance more valuable and self-insurance less valuable. The net e¤ect is
non-monotone for the non-collateral asset premium. If the volatility is pushed high
enough, perfect risk sharing may be obtained; this e¤ect essentially works by reduc-
ing the payo¤ to default. While insurance may be essentially unsustainable when
volatility is especially low, it also becomes unnecessary as idiosyncratic volatility
goes to zero.
I take " = 0:40 as my benchmark for the volatility of the endowment share.19
Table 1 shows a comparison for of the benchmark to a calibrated with " = 0:296 (as
in the benchmark of Alvarez and Jermann (2001)). The increase in volatility carries
through to most of the features of the simulation: consumption, non-collateral asset
holdings, and the standard deviations of the risk-free rate and the return on the non-
collateral asset. It also reduces the risk-free rate and increases the equity premium.
19The value is based on the study of Heaton and Lucas. It is also the benchmark taken by Lustig
(2001).
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The share of collateral in assets is the single most sensitive parameter in the cali-
bration, as Table 2 shows. For the parametric specications considered, for example,
perfect risk-sharing obtains for this share greater than ten percent (  0:9). This
feature of the model can be seen as analogous to other results in the literature. In
models with incomplete markets, numerous authors (e.g., Telmer (1993) and Lucas
(1994)) have shown that, in calibrated general equilibrium economies, agents are
able to shed a great deal of income risk given moderate debt limits. Lucas (1994)
documents that a similar e¤ect is observed in an economy in which 30% of income
accrues to holders of a tradable dividend-yielding outside asset (stock shares). In an
economy with a complete set of state-contingent claims, Lustig (2001) results how a
moderate amount of collateral greatly facilitates risk-sharing in a limited enforcement
economy.
Increasing the subjective discount factor enhances the value of maintaining a
reputation, while it tends also to increase the price of assets yielding dividends in
perpetuity. Table 3 documents the result for the moments under study. The latter
e¤ect reduces the rate of return on the non-collateral asset, reducing the value of the
default payo¤. In these experiments, the risk-free rate tracks the reciprocal of the
subjective discount factor closely. Therefore, it seems that, for a xed value of the
risk-aversion parameter,  indexes a trade-o¤ between achievement of a high equity
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premium and a low risk-free rate.
In parameterizing the model, I have resisted departures from the most conven-
tional preference parameters in order to set the bar high. In particular, the ex-
periments reported below maintain the share of assets in income at  = 0:33; the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion at  = 1; and the volatility of agentsendowment
shares at moderate levels. I believe that the model shows some important successes,
and that this will become more clear as experiments proceed. Under the parametric
constraints I have held so far, however, I have not been able to match simultaneously
and accurately the risk-free rate and the equity premium. It seems apparent that
this cannot be achieved for this low value of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
At the time of writing, I am conducting experiments with higher degrees of risk
aversion and higher values of the discount factor. My casual experiments have led
me to be condent that values of  in the range of 2-3 will easily deliver the high
equity premium; values in this range also imply a satisfying level of volatility in the
risk-free rate. The net interactive e¤ect of changes in these two parameters is not
yet clear to me. Nevertheless, I am condent that the best evidence in favor of the
model has yet to be uncovered.
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12 Conclusions
This paper introduces a framework for the study of limited enforcement economies
in which agents who default on their intertemporal promises retain accumulated hold-
ings of a special "non-collateral" asset, and cannot be excluded from freely trading
that asset in the future. In equilibrium, agents must be given incentives not to de-
fault. The implied equilibration mechanism may induce signicant volatility to the
price of the non-collateral asset, and to other endogenous prices and quantities in
the model. Signicantly, the distribution of the non-collateral asset matters.
By interpreting the non-collateral asset as equity, the model o¤ers a component
explanation for the high price of equity on average  the equity premium puzzle.
Quantitative experiments reveal that the model can generate a signicant equity
premium with agents that are not too risk averse. Within the constraints of my
parameterization, the risk free rate exhibits too little volatility relative to the data.
As of this writing, my experiments fall short of a full explanation for the equity
premium and the risk-free rate puzzles; but I have condence that the contribution
will prove to be signicant, whether or not the puzzles are fully resolved within the
framework.
From this work, and from the work of Seppälä (1999), Kehoe and Perri (2002),
and Lustig (2001,2003), it is clear that study of economies with alternative treatment
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of default in limited enforcement economies is merited. In particular, I believe that
careful modeling of the factors that cause this payo¤ to vary over time will be most
fruitful.
In light of the implications of the model for economies with non-collateral as-
sets, and interpreting results from Telmer (1993), Lucas (1994), and Lustig (2003),
I believe that a more thorough empirical accounting of the stock and quality of col-
lateral verses non-collateral assets is warranted. Although research has sought to
understand the role of collateral in real and model economies, it is seems remiss to
fail to understand the behavior of an asset that is not collateral. I hope that I have
motivated research interest in achieving such an understanding.
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13 Figures and Tables for Chapter 2





















T ransition of Gamma as k goes from 0 (bottom) to 1 (top)
Figure 4. Transition of  as k varies from 0 (bottom) to 1 (top).
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T ransition of k as k (state) goes from 0 (bottom) to 1 (top)
Figure 5. Transition of k as k (state) varies from 0 (bottom) to 1 (top).
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Figure 6. Simulated Time-Series of State Variables.
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Simulated Time-Series of Consumption and Non-Col lateral Asset Holdings (Agent 1)
c1
k1
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sharing Risk E¢ ciently when
Default Punishments may be
Suboptimal
14 Introduction
What characteristics of the consumption processes of a cohort of agents over
time are consistent with equilibrium in a complete markets economy? The canonical
model of frictionless trade in complete markets allows us to reject the hypothesis
whenever we can conclude that intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are not
equated across agents at each point in time. Indeed, one is not hard pressed to
assemble data that contradict this implication of frictionless complete markets.
Recent research has focused on deriving the observable implications for equilib-
rium in economies encumbered by enforcement (or "commitment") frictions, but that
are otherwise frictionless. Of critical importance in such work is the specication of
what agents may accomplish after a behavioral deviation from prescribed or con-
tracted actions; that is, specication of punishments. In this respect, Kehoe and
Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996) have set the paradigm adopted by the rest
of the literature. Following Abreu (1988), These authors each suppose that agents
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are treated to the harshest punishment that is available subject to the exogenously
specied "autarkic" capabilities of individuals. In each case, this corresponds to
some notion of exclusion from participation in some part of economic life.
While the equilibrium concepts in each of these suggest that agents explicitly
acknowledge enforcement constraints, Alvarez and Jermann (2000) suggest that they
may be embodied in market determined restrictions on agentsdebt. Thus, agents in
their setting act in markets in each period facing budget set that includes a system
of state-contingent "solvency constraints". When the solvency constraints are set
appropriately, equilibria of their economy coincide with Kocherlakotas optima.
The philosophy underlying the present work is that markets may organize the
front line (the equilibrium path) of economic behavior, but the consequences to
a single agent who deviates from the norm of prescribed behavior is taken as ex-
ogenously, possibly suboptimally, determined. More precisely, rather than choose
punishments optimally, I assume that deviating agents are punished by reversion to
some arbitrary subgame perfect continuation equilibrium. The fundamental result of
the paper shows that a very wide class of allocations can be rationalized as equilibria
in markets with enforcement constraints.
In the next section, I introduce the environment and the underlying game played
by its agents. In the third section, I exposit the principal result of the paper. The
117
fourth section compares my results to those of Alvarez and Jermann (2000), and
states a version of the Second Welfare Theorem for my environment. The nal
sections discuss my results and conclude.
15 Model
15.1 Environment
Time is discrete and innite, and is indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; ::: There are I < 1
agents in the economy indexed by i 2 I = f1; 2; :::; Ig :
Stochastic features of the environment are summarized by a random process st
that evolves according to a probability measure : Each st is an element of a nite
set S: I write st 2 St+1 for the history of the exogenous shock process up to date
t: the initial state s0 will be taken as given and left implicit where there can be no
confusion. All stochastic processes in this paper are assumed to be adapted to :
For any such process x; I will write xjst for the continuation of x after history st;
that is, xjst is a stochastic process for initial state st: (I assume that  is one-period
Markovian.)
There is a single (consumption) good in the economy available at each date.
The aggregate endowment of the good is one unit. At each history st at which the
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state is st; agent i is endowed with a fraction ei (st) > 0 units of the good, whereP
i e
i (st) = 1:




















 (s jst) ;
where u : R+ ! R[f 1g is strictly concave and strictly increasing. I will also
assume that limc!0 u (c) = u (0) ; which may be equal to  1:
It will be useful to dene the payo¤ from autarkic consumption,









 (s jst) :
15.2 A Game of Multilateral Transfers
The game dened here is a generalization of that studied by Kocherlakota (1996)
to the case of Markov shocks and an arbitrary number of agents.
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The set of actions available to i in history st is
Ai (st) =
(
a 2 RI+ :
X
j
aj  ei (st)
)
:
I will write a (st) for the prole of actions taken by each agent after state history st:
A game history for the period t is a pairing of a state history st and a history of
actions played for each st  for 1    t: Let H t be the set of all histories of length
t+ 1; ht = (s0; a (s
0) ; s1; a (s
1) ; :::; st 1; a (s
t 1) ; st) :
A (pure) strategy for player i is a mapping i from game histories to actions
feasible for agent i for the current state. That is, i (ht) 2 Ai (st) : A strategy prole
is a collection of strategies, one for each player.
I will denote by  the probability measure induced over game histories by  and
a strategy prole : (Note that the restriction to pure strategies implies that the
induced probability measure is made up entirely of mass points.) The single period






































where  denotes the probability measure induced over game histories by  and a
strategy prole : Note that disposal of the good may be accomplished at ht by agent
i by setting ii (h
t) > 0:
A (pure strategy) subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a strategy prole  such














where ~i is any alternative strategy for agent i: Let  (s) be the set of all SPEs
starting from state s: Write 
 (s) for the set of all vectors w 2 RI such that there is
a  2  (s) that gives continuation payo¤ wi to each player i:
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16 E¢ ciency and Equilibrium under Arbitrary Pun-
ishment Conventions
Let ! be a stochastic process on RI : I will say that ! is a feasible punishment
convention if, for each i and st  s0; there is a w 2 
 (st) such that wi = !i (st) : I will
investigate the equilibria that can be supported by reversion in the period following
a deviation at st 1 by i to some continuation equilibrium that gives st-continuation
payo¤ !i (st) to i. Note that the continuation equilibria supporting the punishments
of the various players need not be the same at st; that is, for j 6= i; the jth element
of the w described in the denition need not equal !j (st) :
Let ~! be a stochastic process on RI : Say that an allocation c is supported by ~!





















for all i and st  s0; in this case, write c 2 P (s0; ~!) :
The following lemma can be seen as a result of the one-deviation property of
innite games.
Lemma 15 If c is supported by a feasible punishment convention ! from s0; then
there is an SPE that implements c on the equilibrium path starting from initial state
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s0.
Let ~! be a stochastic process on RI : I will say that c is e¢ cient with respect to


















for some  in the I-dimensional unit simplex. Although there is nothing in the
denition requiring that c is implemented by some SPE, the previous lemma implies
that this is the case whenever ! is a feasible punishment convention. In this paper, I
apply the term e¢ cient generically to an allocation to mean that it is e¢ cient with
respect to some feasible punishment convention.




















































The primary result of this paper is the following one.
Proposition 16 Given a feasible allocation c; suppose that (i)
P
i c
i (st) = 1 for all































Then there exists a feasible punishment convention ! such that c is e¢ cient with
respect to ! from s0:
Before giving the proof, I present several auxiliary results useful in the proof of
the main one.
Lemma 17 (The Abreu property) Suppose that c is a feasible allocation. Then there
is an SPE that implements c if and only if U i (cjst)  U iaut (st) for all i and st:
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Proof. Necessity is obvious from the denition of an SPE, and the fact that ij (h
t) =
0 for all j and ht denes a strategy that gives at least U iaut (st) to i at each history
ht:
To show su¢ ciency, I construct a "simple" (Abreu) pure strategy prole  that
implements c on its path. I then show that  is an equilibrium. I will write h (st)
for the game history prescribed by  for exogenous history st; and I let H be the set
of all other histories.20
I begin by describing play following a deviation: let  (ht) = 0 for all ht 2 H: That
such play describes an equilibrium for the subgame following from ht is obvious, since
all h  ht are in H; and any unilateral deviation can be seen to hurt the deviating
player.
Dene i (st) := ei (st) ci (st) ; dene K (st) :=

k 2 Ijk (st) > 0
	
; and K (st) =
20It would be more precise to construct the path of  and the function h () by recursions, and
then dene  for histories o¤ the path. This could be done as follows. First let h (s0) = s0 and




















for each s0; and then dening  (h (st)) : That such an algorithm is available for the strategy prole
I describe is obvious.
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k (st) if j 2 K (st) :
I have now described  (ht) for all histories on and o¤ the path, and it is easy to
verify that  implements c on the prescribed path.
To see that  constitutes an SPE for histories on the path, note that a deviation










U iaut (s0) = U iaut (st) ;
since the constructed strategy gives at least this much to i at h (st) anyway, the one-
deviation property implies that there can be no protable deviation from ; Q.E.D.
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Corollary 18 
 (s) is convex for each s:
Proof. The set of allocations that can be supported by strategies constructed as
in the lemma above can be seen to be convex. The convexity of 
 (s) is then easy
to establish from the continuity and concavity of U (js) in allocations, and the fact
that strategies permit free-disposal of the good.
Lemma 19 Let ! be a stochastic process on RI satisfying !i (st)  U iaut (st) for all
i and st: Suppose that there is a feasible allocation c such that U i (cjst)  !i (st) for
all i and st: Then ! is a feasible punishment convention.
Proof. Fix st and i: Let caut be the autarkic allocation, and dene c := c +
(1  ) caut for  2 [0; 1] : By the properties of u (), it can be seen that the function
 7 ! U i (c) is continuous and concave on [0; 1] :21 Therefore, there is a  such that
U i (cjst) = !i (st) : Moreover, it must be true that U j (cjst)  U jaut (st) for all j and
st: Therefore Lemma 17 shows that there is an SPE that implements cjst; i.e., there
is an SPE continuation that gives !i (st) to player i at st: Repeating this analysis for
each i and st; proves the result.
Lemma 20 If c is a feasible allocation, and U i (cjst)  U iaut (st) for all st; then
u (ci (st)) is bounded.
21This is easily established after noting that caut is bounded away from zero.
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Proof. Clearly, u (ci (st))  u (1) ; so U i (cjst)  u (1) = (1  ) : Thus U i (cjst) 
































The result follows from the fact that S is nite.
Proof of the Proposition. The proof is constructive.
I begin by setting !i (s0; s0) := U iaut (s0) for each i:22 Other values of ! (st) are set
according to the following algorithm.










set !i (st; s0) = U iaut (s0) for each s0: If instead (45) holds, then by the hypothesis of


































By the convexity of 
 (s0) (Corollary 18) and the fact that autarky can be supported
as an equilibrium (Lemma 17), there exists a selection w : S ! RI from 
 (i.e., a
function with w (s) 2 














wi (s0) (s0jst) ;
(Note that Lemma 17 implies that wj (s0)  U jaut (s0) for each j and s0; because
w (s0) 2 
 (s0).) Choose some such function and set !i (st; s0) = wi (s0) for each s0:
Repeating the procedure for each i and st > s0 such that (45) holds denes a
function !: It follows from Lemma 19 that ! denes a feasible punishment convention.















































for all i and st: The Lagrangian function for this problem can be written as















































































To show that c solves such a programming problem it su¢ ces (by Theorem 2 on page
221 of Luenberger) to nd  and multipliers (; ) such that (c; ; ) constitutes a
saddle point of L (c; ; ) :23 I begin by dening appropriate weights and multipliers.
23Note that, for the purpose of the Theorem of Luenberger, the Lagrange multipliers are the
sequences whose elements are t (st) (stjs0) and ti (st) (stjs0) : If follows from (iii) that each
of these sequences constructed in the proof is summable, so that each sequence denes an element
of the norm dual space of l1:
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i (s ) + i (st:s0)
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u0 (cj (st; s0))
u0 (cj (st))






































note that the expression on the right-hand side is independent of i:
By construction, the multipliers (; ) can be seen to minimize L (c; ; ) over all
non-negative alternatives. It remains to verify that c maximizes L (; ; ) :







































u  ci (s )  (s jst)) ;
and the Right-hand side is bounded. Thus (e.g., by Theorem 3.55 of Rudin (p.78))
terms in the expression may be rearranged without changing the value of the sum.
























































is non-negative for all allocations ~c: Now using the denition of  (st) ; and combining









































By the concavity of u; this expression is non-negative, Q.E.D.
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17 Decentralization
The notion of market equilibrium introduced in this section is a generalization of
that studied by Alvarez and Jermann.
A portfolio of contingent claims for agent i is a stochastic process bi with bi (st) 2
R: I write b for the prole of agentsportfolios.
An (Arrow) price system is a positive stochastic process q; where q (st) is inter-
preted as the price after (exogenous) history st 1 of a claim to a unit of the good
after history st:
A system of solvency constraints is a stochastic process d with d (st) 2 RI :
A (market) equilibrium with solvency constraints is a consumption allocation c; a
prole of portfolios b; a price system q; and a system of solvency constraints d such
that









































for each s0; and















Let ~! be an I-vector stochastic process; that is, ~! (st) 2 RI : I will say that the





















for all i; t; and st
An important result of Alvarez and Jermann is a version of the Second Wel-
fare Theorem. They show that an allocation that is e¢ cient with respect to the
134





:= U iaut (st) ;
and that has high implied interest rates can be decentralized by an equilibrium
with solvency constraints that are appropriate for !aut: The following proposition
generalizes this result for an environment with an arbitrary punishment convention.
Proposition 21 Suppose that c is e¢ cient with respect to a feasible punishment !;
and that c 2 HIR: Then there exists a prole of portfolios b; a price system q; and
a system of solvency constraints d such that (c; b; q; d) constitute an equilibrium with
solvency constraints that are appropriate for !:
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Proposition 4.1 of Alvarez and Jermann
(2000).
18 Discussion
The fourth condition of the hypothesis of Proposition 16 merits some discussion.
This condition is just the requirement that, whenever the rationalization of c requires
that the enforcement constraint be binding, there is some equilibrium path that
begins with ei (st) that gives a payo¤ at least as good as cjst: One implication is
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that, in a period in which his enforcement constraint binds, is consumption cannot



























(Note that (i) and (ii) imply that c is an equilibrium path, so that the term on
the Right-hand side is non-negative.) Violation of this condition means that feasible
punishments are too harsh to explain why i is constrained at st:
19 Conclusion
The main result of the paper identies a set of conditions under which it is
possible to rationalize a given consumption allocation as an e¢ cient outcome of a
simple multilateral exchange game subject to an exogenously specied convention for
punishing misbehavior. As in Kocherlakota (1996), I assume that society chooses an
allocation e¢ ciently (in some sense) from among those implemented in a subgame
perfect equilibrium. As a novelty, I consider the consequences of ine¢ ciencies o¤ the
equilibrium path.
A heuristic motivation for studying such an environment is the notion that, while
markets may facilitate the arrival of the economy at a locally e¢ cient outcome, there
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may be a less e¤ective coordination device selecting continuations to be followed o¤
the equilibrium path. Since these "punishment" continuations determine which paths
may be sustained in equilibrium, this feature is obviously important.
I believe that more thorough study of the form of punishments for misbehavior
is important for two reasons. First, it is likely that economic agents view the con-
sequences of default in a more complex and interesting way than can be captured
by "autarkic consumption". Second, Proposition 16 informs us that there is a lot of
latitude in what may be explained by feasible punishments, and thus potentially a
lot to be gained by being careful about modeling them.
My own research agenda includes study of calibrated economies with more care-
fully modeled alternatives to market participation. I also nd compelling the possi-
bility of the recovery from data of punishments rationalizing an observed pattern of
consumption within a cohort. Working backwards from data will help us to under-
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